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According to the United Nations’ World Population Ageing Report (2015), the
number of older persons - those aged 60 years or over - is expected to more than
double by 2050 and to more than triple by 2100, rising from 962 million globally in
2017 to 2.1 billion in 2050. Globally, the population aged 60 or over is growing faster
than all younger age groups. Managing old-age pension assets and insuring against
longevity risk is one of major concerns for both governments and individuals in the
21st century.
In his seminal paper, Yaari (1965) showed that in the absence of any bequest mo-
tives, non-altruistic individuals should fully annuitize their assets to insure against
the longevity risk (outliving their assets), provided that the annuity market is ac-
tuarially fair. Davidoff et al. (2005) demonstrated further that full annuitization is
welfare-enhancing in a more general setting: when annuities are less than actuarially
fair but provide a higher net rate of return than the capital market. Despite its the-
oretical attractiveness, private annuity markets are notoriously thin, and annuities
are often over-priced and rarely purchased if they are available. The sharp contrast
between the insurance function of annuities and almost non-existent private annuity
markets are commonly dubbed ‘Annuity Puzzle’ (Inkmann et al. 2011).
Among the many explanations that individuals shy away from the annuity mar-
ket, one is that annuities are priced unattractively due to asymmetric information.
When individual’s health is unobservable to annuity firms, adverse selection arises
because healthy individuals are more likely to buy annuities. This implies the ‘high-
risk’ types are overrepresented in the annuity purchasers. They crowd out unhealthy
individuals and drive up the price of annuities. A traditional policy options to ad-
dress adverse selection is to employ the social security system - a public annuitiza-
tion tool - to include everyone in the annuity pool (see, for example, Eckstein et
al., 1985). These studies are often conducted in a partial equilibrium framework and
the macroeconomic effects are missing. We explore further the details of addressing
the origins of annuity puzzle and various policy options to enhance social welfare.
For instance, we take into considerations the welfare implications of optimal pen-
sion rules and privatizing of social security. When individuals are heterogeneous in
health status, the public social security system often redistributes resources from the
unhealthy to the healthy. The redistribution role of social security system matters
for the individual welfare and the optimal pension benefit rule needs to be arranged.
When public social security does not necessarily enhance individual welfare in the
general framework, the welfare implications of privatizing social security also needs
to be investigated.
In Chapter 2 we build an overlapping-generations model to study the macroeco-
nomic effects of private and public annuity markets with asymmetric information.
We extend the work by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012) by assuming that individuals
differ by two dimensions of heterogeneity - health and ability, which are positively
correlated. We find that adverse selection caused by asymmetric information sub-
stantially reduces steady-state output per efficiency unit of labour and the capital
intensity in the general equilibrium setting. The introduction of a social security sys-
3tem aggravates adverse selection and reduces output per efficiency unit and capital
intensity further. The welfare effects of social security depend both on the individual
type (health and ability) and the pension benefit rule. If pension benefits are pro-
portional to an individual’s contribution during youth and the percentage is fixed
for everybody, then the social security system makes everybody worse off in the long
run. Nevertheless, it is not a guarantee that the privatization of social security is
Pareto improving for all generations. In the simulations we show that the abolition
of a social security system featuring a proportional pension benefit rule will harm
shock-time generations. That is, healthy individuals born at the time of the shock
would have been better off if the social security system had not been privatized.
Chapter 3 gives rise to a possible explanation of the ‘Annuity Puzzle’. Starting
from Yaari (1965), economic theory would predict that at least a substantial share
of individual assets should be annuitized, whilst in reality individuals hold their
assets mainly in non-annuitized savings. Explanations for it have been sought both
in the rational and the behavioral domain. Within the rational domain the focus has
been predominantly on market imperfections such as asymmetric information and
adverse selection. Another likely explanation is that people have a bequest motive,
which substantially reduces their desire to annitize their assets. However, neither
explanation alone could rationalize the annuity puzzle. As Davidoff et al. (2005)
show in a two-period life-cycle model, individuals should annuitize all their assets as
long as the annuity premium is higher than the return on capital markets, regardless
of whether the annuity premium has been driven down by asymmetric information
and adverse selection. And if the annuity market is actuarially-fair, individuals would
be better off annuitizing all assets that they wish to consume in old age, despite
a motive to leave bequest to their children. Hence, we combine the two commonly
considered explanations of the annuity puzzle - asymmetric information and bequest
motive - to show that their interplay can account for the ‘Annuity Puzzle’.
The intuition behind the ‘interplay mechanism’ is that bequest motives enhance
the value of non-annuitized savings so that in order for individuals to choose annuities
over non-annuitized assets, they require annuities to priced nearly actuarially fair.
This is, however, often not possible due to the asymmetric information and adverse
selection. Later we extend the ‘interplay mechanism’ further by including a pay-as-
you-go social security system and a health-wealth nexus. As to be expected, a public
pension system aggravates the adverse selection and leads unhealthy individuals
to retreat from the annuity market. And since social security is non-bequeathable,
healthy individuals reduces the share of annuities in their retirement savings portfolio
substantially. Similarly, a positive correlation between health and earning ability of
individuals will aggravate adverse selection on the annuity market as the heavier
annuity investment of healthier individuals will push down the annuity premium
more than if such correlations are absent.
In Chapter 4 we investigate the welfare effects of opening up an annuity market in
the presence of bequest motive in a general equilibrium context. While individuals
may benefit from actuarially-fair - or at least not too unfair - annuities, it need
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not translate into social welfare improvement. As pointed out by previous studies,
private and public benefits of annuities differ due to the loss of unintended bequests.
Heijdra et al. (2014) show that the welfare effects can best be understood by reference
to the Golden Rule. In the absence of annuities, unconsumed savings flow to the
next generation, and this intergenerational transfer moves the economy closer to the
Golden Rule as long as the economy is dynamically efficient. Opening up an annuity
market cuts off this intergenerational transfer and as a consequence reduces capital
intensity and individual welfare.
In this chapter we revisit the welfare implication of annuitization in the presence
of intended bequests in a general equilibrium setting. By attaching a utility value to
bequest, intended bequest motives can potentially mitigate the general equilibrium
welfare loss by establishing the intergenerational transfer channel. Indeed, we find
that stronger bequest motives are associated with higher capital accumulation be-
cause they entail a redistribution of assets from the older to the younger generation.
We highlight the result that when bequest motives are taken into considerations,
opening up an annuity market will lead to a decrease in capital accumulation and
individual welfare (Tragedy of Annuitization). Meanwhile, we observe that this neg-
ative general equilibrium effect is dampened by the presence of bequest motives.
In Chapter 5 we develop a two-period overlapping-generations model where fer-
tility is endogenous to study the optimal fertility rate for the society. A utility value
is attached to fertility so that individuals derive utility not only from consumption,
but also from their offsprings. Michel and Pestieau (1993) find that there exists an
interior Samuelson Serendipity Equilibrium (SSE) for several constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) utility and technology cases. We build on their work and relax
the assumptions of full depreciation of capital, no utility derived from children, and
no future labour supply. By using a numerical simulation we show that there exists
an interior solution for the socially optimal fertility decision. However, the optimal
fertility decision in the market equilibrium does not necessarily imply the socially
optimum fertility decision. Thus, we compared two concepts of social optimization:
the Samuelson Social Welfare concept which maximizes the steady-state welfare of
a representative young individual, and Social Welfare Function where the social op-
timum is dynamically consistent. We prefer the latter one since it provides us a tool
to analyze individual decisions across generations. Finally, we show that a market
economy with child taxes and intergenerational transfers replicates the first-best so-
cial optimum under the social welfare function. Last but not least, we find that the
transitional path to the social optimum is an improvement in the long run.
This thesis aims to study the financial and social insurance against longevity
risk both from the individual’s perspective and the society as a whole. Interestingly,
utility-maximizing individual decisions do not always lead to the socially optimal
equilibrium. The mechanisms behind are better-understood in our small macroeco-
nomic models. We aim to provide an insight into the roles of annuity, bequest and
fertility in providing insurance against longevity risk for the old-age people. We hope
that this thesis contributes to the discussion of old-age insurance when ageing has
5become one of the most urging problems globally in the 21st century.
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Chapter 2
The Macroeconomic effects of
longevity risk under private
and public insurance and
asymmetric information∗
*This chapter is based on Heijdra, Jiang and Mierau (2019a).
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2.1 Introduction
More than half a century ago Yaari (1965) proved convincingly that private annu-
ities are very attractive insurance instruments when non-altruistic individuals face
longevity risk. Simply put, annuities are desirable because they insure such agents
against the risk of outliving their assets. Yaari also proved a much stronger result: in
the absence of an intentional bequest motive, rational utility-maximizing individuals
should fully annuitize all of their savings. Yaari derives this result under the strong
assumption that actuarially fair annuities are available. In a more recent paper,
however, Davidoff et al. (2005) have demonstrated that the full annuitization result
holds in a much more general setting than the one adopted by Yaari, for example
when annuities are less than actuarially fair.
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of annuities, there is a vast body of empir-
ical evidence showing that in reality people do not invest heavily in private annuity
markets. The discrepancy between the theoretical predictions and the observable
facts regarding annuity markets is known as the annuity puzzle. Of course there
are many reasons why individuals may not choose to fully annuitize their wealth.
Friedman and Warshawsky (1990, pp. 136-7), for example, argue that purchases of
private annuities are low because (a) individuals may want to leave bequests to their
offspring, (b) agents may already implicitly hold social annuities because they are
participating in a system of mandatory public pensions, and (c) private annuities
may be priced unattractively, for example because of transaction costs and taxes,
excessive profits extracted by imperfectly competitive annuity firms, and adverse
selection. Intuitively, under asymmetric information annuity companies cannot ob-
serve an individual’s health status. Adverse selection arises in such a setting because
agents with above-average health are more likely to buy annuities. This implies that
such “high-risk types” are overrepresented in the group of clients of annuity firms
and that pricing of annuities cannot be based on the average health status of the
population at large.
While recognizing their potential role in accounting for parts of the annuity
puzzle, we ignore intentional bequest motives, administrative costs, and imperfect
competition in this Chapter.1 Instead, we follow inter alia Abel (1986), Walliser
(2000), Palmon and Spivak (2007), Sheshinski (2008), and Heijdra and Reijnders
(2012) by focusing on the adverse selection channel. We approach the material se-
quentially by first demonstrating the adverse selection effect in an economy without
public pensions. In the next step we introduce social annuities and study the general
equilibrium interactions between private and public annuity markets under different
pension benefit rules.
This Chapter is most closely related to earlier work by Heijdra and Reijnders
(2012). They study a discrete-time overlapping generations model in which non-
altruistic agents differ in their innate health status, which is assumed to be private
information. The private annuity market settles in a risk-pooling equilibrium in
1These features will be studied in depth in Chapter 3 and 4.
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which the unhealthiest segment of the population experiences binding borrowing
constraints (because they are unable to go short on annuities) and the other agents
receive a common yield on their annuity purchases. They also show that the intro-
duction of a mandatory public pension system—though immune to adverse selection
by design—leads to a reduction in steady-state welfare, an aggravation of adverse
selection in the private annuity market, and a reduction in the economy-wide capital
intensity.
We extend the work by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012) by assuming that the in-
dividuals populating the economy differ by two dimensions of heterogeneity (health
and ability) rather than just a single one (health). The introduction of heterogeneous
abilities serves two purposes. First, as was shown by Walliser (2000, pp. 374-375)
in a partial equilibrium setting, “(the simulations reveal that) between 40 and 60
percent of the measured adverse selection is due to the positive correlation between
income and mortality…” By incorporating health-ability heterogeneity, and by as-
suming that there is a positive correlation between the two characteristics, we are
able to capture this reputedly important source of adverse selection in the private
annuity market. There is a second reason why heterogeneity matters which is related
to the type of funded public pension system that is in place. Indeed, depending on
the details regarding pension contributions and receipts, social security systems can
have vastly different welfare implications for consumers with different health sta-
tus and/or ability. In this paper we consider three different public pension schemes
which differ in the degree to which they lead to (implicit or explicit) redistribution
from healthy to unhealthy individuals.
Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, a plausibly calibrated version of the
model reveals that, compared to the case with full information, asymmetric informa-
tion on the part of annuity companies is important quantitatively in that it causes
substantial reductions in steady-state output per efficiency unit of labour and the
capital intensity. The general equilibrium effects are thus shown to matter a lot.
Second, the introduction of a funded social security system reduces the capital in-
tensity and output per efficiency unit even further, more so the larger is the system,
i.e. the higher is the replacement rate it incorporates. These results are consistent
with Palmon and Spivak (2007) and Heijdra and Reijnders (2012). Third, privatiz-
ing social security (by abolishing the public pension system) is not generally Pareto
improving to all generations. Indeed, in our simulations we find that healthy agents
born at the time of the shock would have been better off if the social security system
had not been privatized. Just as for unfunded pensions, getting rid of a pre-existing
funded system is not an easy task to accomplish.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we set up the
model and characterize the microeconomic choices and the resulting macroeconomic
equilibrium under full information, i.e. the hypothetical case in which insurance
companies can perfectly observe an individual’s characteristics. In Section 2.3 we
introduce asymmetric information inhibiting insurance companies and show that it
leads to a pooling equilibrium in the annuity market. In Section 2.4 we introduce a
10 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
fully-funded social security system in which pension contributions are proportional to
labour income during youth. We analyze three specific versions of this system which
differ with respect to the pension receipts during old age. Section 2.5 considers
the consequences of privatizing social security. The final section concludes. Some
technical issues are dealt with in three brief appendices.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Consumers
In each period the population in the closed economy under consideration features two
overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents. Each person can live at most for
two periods, namely ‘youth’ (superscript y) and ‘old age’ (superscript o). Individuals
are heterogenous along two exogenously given dimensions. First, they differ by health
status which we capture by the probability of surviving into old-age. Everyone faces
lifetime uncertainty at the end of the first period, and the survival probability is
denoted by µ. This means that unhealthy people have a higher risk of dying and a
shorter expected life span (which equals 1+µ periods). Second, individuals differ in
their working ability as proxied by innate labour productivity η.
We assume that consumer types are continuous and uniformly distributed on
these two dimensions, i.e. µ ∈ [µL, µH ] (such that 0 < µL < µH < 1) and η ∈ [ηL, ηH ]
(such that 0 < ηL < ηH). Furthermore, we postulate that µ and η are positively
correlated. Hence, a person in better health is more likely to possess higher working
abilities, and vice versa. The bivariate uniform distribution used in this paper is
characterized by the following probability density function:
h(µ, η) =
1 + ξ (µ− µ¯)(η − η¯)
(µH − µL)(ηH − ηL) , (2.1)
where ξ is a parameter regulating the correlation between µ and η (such that ξ > 0),
and µ¯ and η¯ denote the unconditional means of µ and η, respectively. In Figure 2.1 the
distribution function is depicted in panel (a) whilst the probability density function
is shown in panel (b). From the graph of the density function it is clear that there
is a higher probability for healthier consumers to possess higher working abilities,
and vice versa. For future reference we postulate Lemma 1 which summarizes some
useful properties of the bivariate distribution that we employ.
Lemma 1. The distribution function for the survival probability µ and labour pro-
ductivity η is given by:
H(µ, η) =
(µ− µL)(η − ηL)





(µH − µ)(ηH − η)
]
,
where µL ≤ µ ≤ µH and ηL ≤ η ≤ ηH . The density function is given in (2.1).
Further properties of the distribution are: (i) the marginal density functions are
hµ(µ) = 1/(µH − µL) and hη(µ) = 1/(ηH − ηL); (ii) the unconditional means are
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Figure 2.1: Features of the distribution for µ and η
(a) Distribution (b) Density
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Legend Health and innate ability are proxied by, respectively, the survival prob-
ability µ and the labour productvity parameter η. The two characteristics of an
individual are positively correlated. The distribution H(µ, η) is bivariate uniform.
The marginal distributions of µ and η are both uniform. See Appendix A and Lemma
2.1 for further features of the distribution.
µ¯ = (µL + µH)/2 and η¯ = (ηL + ηH)/2; (iii) the unconditional variances are σ2µ =
(µH − µL)2 /12 and σ2η = (ηH − ηL)2 /12; (iv) the covariance is cov (η, µ) = ξσ2ησ2µ
and the correlation is cor (η, µ) = ξσησµ; (v) the conditional probability density
functions are:
hµ|η (µ) ≡ h (η, µ)
hη (η)
=
1 + ξ (µ− µ¯)(η − η¯)
µH − µL ,
hη|µ (η) ≡ h (η, µ)
hµ (µ)
=
1 + ξ (µ− µ¯)(η − η¯)
ηH − ηL ,




ηh (η, µ) dη∫ ηH
ηL







= η¯ + ξσ2η(µ− µ¯).
Proof: see Appendix A. ■
From the perspective of birth, the expected lifetime utility of a person with health
status µ and working ability η is given by:





where Cyt (µ, η) and Cot+1(µ, η) are consumption during youth and old age, respec-
tively, β is the parameter capturing pure time preference (0 < β < 1), and U(C) is





1− 1/σ , for σ ̸= 1,
lnC for σ = 1,
(2.3)
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ > 0). Equation (2.2) incor-
porates the assumption that individuals do not have a bequest motive, i.e. utility
solely depends on own consumption during one’s lifetime.
In this section we postulate the existence of perfect private annuities. Specifically,
we adopt the following assumptions regarding the market for private annuities:
(A0) Health status is public information.
(A1) The annuity market is perfectly competitive. A large number of risk-neutral
firms offer annuities to individuals, and annuity firms can freely enter or exit
the market.
(A2) Annuity firms do not use up any real resources.
As is explained by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, pp. 322–3), in this Full Information
case (abbreviated as FI) each health type receives its actuarially fair rate of return
and achieves perfect insurance against longevity risk. If Apt (µ, η) denotes the private
annuity holdings of an agent of health type µ then the net rate of return on annuities
will be equal to:




where rt+1 is the net rate of return on physical capital (see also below). Since the
survival rate is such that 0 < µ < 1, it follows from (2.4) that rpt+1 (µ) exceeds rt+1
so that all agents will completely annuitize their wealth. This classic result was first
derived by Yaari (1965).
We assume that individuals work full time during youth and part time in old age
as a result of a system of mandatory retirement. With full annuitization of assets
the periodic budget identities are given by:
Cyt (µ, η) +A
p
t (µ, η) = wt(η), (2.5)




t (µ, η), (2.6)
where wt(η) is the wage rate of an η type in period t, λ is the proportion of time
that is devoted to work in old age (0 < λ < 1), and 1+ rpt+1 (µ) is the rate of return
on private annuities. The periodic budget identities can be combined to obtain the
consolidated budget constraint:
Cyt (µ, η) +
Cot+1(µ, η)
1 + rpt+1 (µ)
= wt(η) +
λwt+1(η)
1 + rpt+1 (µ)
. (2.7)
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The present value of lifetime consumption (left-hand side) equals the present value
of lifetime income (right-hand side). That is, people consume their human wealth.
Consumers choose Cyt (µ, η) and Cot+1(µ, η) in order to maximize expected lifetime
utility (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (2.7). The optimal consumption plans
and annuity demands are fully characterized by:











































where we have substituted the expression for the actuarially fair annuity rate (2.4),
and where Φ(µ, x) is the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime income
during youth:
Φ(µ, x) ≡ 1
1 + (µβ)σxσ−1
. (2.11)
From equations (2.8) and (2.9) we find that consumption during youth and old-age
are both proportional to human wealth. Furthermore, equation (2.10) shows that
annuity demand depends positively on the wage income during youth and negatively
on old-age labour income.
The optimal consumption choices of different types of consumers are illustrated
in Figure 2.2. To avoid cluttering the diagram we illustrate the choices made by
the four extreme types, unhealthy and healthy lowest-skilled (µL, ηL) and (µH , ηL),
and unhealthy and healthy highest-skilled (µL, ηH) and (µH , ηH). For a given work-
ing ability type ηi, the line labelled LBC(µL, ηi) and LBC(µH , ηi) are the lifetime
budget constraints as given in (2.7). For skill type ηL the income endowment point
(wt(η), λwt+1(η)) is located at point EL. With perfect annuities, LBC(µL, ηi) is
steeper than LBC(µH , ηi) because the unhealthy get a much higher annuity rate
than the healthy.
In the presence of perfect annuities and under full annuitization, the consumption
Euler equation is given by:
U ′(Cyt (µ, η))
βU ′(Cot+1 (µ, η))
= µ
(
1 + rpt+1 (µ)
)
= 1 + rt+1, (2.12)
where we have used (2.4) to get from the first to the second equality. The crucial thing
to note is that all agents equate the marginal rate of substitution between current
and future consumption to the gross interest factor on capital. Intuitively, as was
first pointed out by Yaari (1965), the mortality rate drops out of the expression
characterizing the life-cycle profile of consumption because agents are fully insured
against the unpleasant aspects of lifetime uncertainty. For the homothetic felicity
function (2.3) it is easy to show that (2.12) is a ray from the origin—see the locus
labelled MRSC in Figure 2.2. Optimal choices are located at the intersection of
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Legend LBC(µi, ηj) is the lifetime budget constraint for an individual with survival
probability µi and productivity level ηj . IEL is the income endowment line and
agents are located on the line segment ELEH . MRSC is the consumption Euler
equation under perfect information with actuarially fair annuities at the individual
level. Optimal consumption for individual (µi, ηj) is located at the intersection of
MRSC and LBC(µi, ηj). All individuals purchase annuities.
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MRSC and the relevant lifetime budget constraint. It follows that types (µL, ηL)
and (µH , ηL) consume at points A and B respectively.
What about the choices made by the highest-ability types? Given the specifica-
tion of technology adopted below, it follows that wt(η) = ηwt and wt+1(η) = ηwt+1
so that income endowment points lie along the ray from the origin labelled IEL. Fur-
thermore, it follows from (2.7) that LBC(µL, ηH) is parallel to LBC(µL, ηL) whilst
LBC(µH , ηH) is parallel to LBC(µH , ηL). Hence types (µL, ηH) and (µH , ηH) con-
sume at points C and D respectively.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the microeconomic behaviour discussed
in this subsection. First, in this closed economy featuring a positive capital stock
(see below) all agents are net savers, i.e. everybody expresses a positive demand
for private annuities, Apt (µ, η) > 0 for all µ and η. This result follows readily from
Figure 2.2 because the MRSC line lies to the left of the IEL line. Second, for a given
value of agent productivity η, the demand for annuities is increasing in the survival
probability µ, i.e. ∂Apt (µ, η)/∂µ > 0. Intuitively, healthy people buy more annuities
than do unhealthy people of the same skill category because they expect to live
longer a priori. Again this result follows readily from Figure 2.2 because LBC(µL, ηi)
is steeper than LBC(µH , ηi). Third, the demand for annuities is increasing in the
skill level, i.e. ∂Apt (µ, η)/∂η > 0. This can be see graphically in Figure 2.2 and can
be proved formally by noting that Apt (µ, η) in (2.10) is linear in η.
2.2.2 Demography
Let Lt denote the size of the population cohort born at time t. The density of
consumers with health type µ and working ability η is thus:
Lt(µ, η) ≡ h(µ, η)Lt, (2.13)
where the density function h(µ, η) is stated in (2.1) above. The density of (young







Lt(µ, η)dη = µhµ(µ)Lt−1 + hµ(µ)Lt, (2.14)
where hµ(µ) is the marginal distribution of µ (see Lemma 1(i)). If newborn cohort
sizes evolves according to Lt = (1 + n)Lt−1 (with n > −1), the total population at





1 + n+ µ¯
1 + n
Lt, (2.15)
where µ¯ ≡ ∫ µH
µL
µhµ(µ)dµ is the average survival rate of a newborn cohort.
2.2.3 Production
We assume that perfect competition prevails in the goods market. The technology
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where Yt is total production, Kt is the aggregate capital stock, ε is the efficiency
parameter of capital (0 < ε < 1), Ω0 is total factor productivity (assumed to be






η [Lt(µ, η) + λLt−1(µ, η)] dµdη. (2.17)
Note that Nt has the dimension of worker efficiency (denoted by η) times number of
working hours. By using (2.13) in (2.17) and noting that Lt = (1 + n)Lt−1 we find






[η¯µ¯+ cov (η, µ)] , (2.18)
where cov (η, µ) ≡ ξσ2ησ2µ is the (positive) covariance between µ and η (see Lemma
1(iv)).
By defining yt ≡ Yt/Nt and kt ≡ Kt/Nt, the intensive-form production function




Firms choose efficiency units of labour and the capital stock such that profits are
maximized. This optimization problem gives the following factor demand equations:
rt + δ = εΩ0k
ε−1
t , (2.20)
wt = (1− ε)Ω0kεt , (2.21)
wt(η) = ηwt, (2.22)
where rt is the net rate of return on physical capital, δ is the depreciation rate of
capital (0 < δ < 1), and wt is the rental rate on efficiency units of labour. With
perfect substitutability of efficiency units of labour, the wage rate of a η type worker,
wt(η), is η times the rental rate wt (as was asserted above).
2.2.4 Equilibrium
The model is completed by a description of the macroeconomic equilibrium. Since






Apt (µ, η)h(µ, η)dηdµ, (2.23)
where Apt (µ, η) is given in (2.10) above. Intuitively, equation (2.23) says that next
period’s aggregate capital stock is equal to total savings in the current period (con-
sisting of private annuities). By substituting the demand for annuities (2.10) and
the wage equation (2.22) into (2.23) we obtain the fundamental difference equation
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where Γ1(µ) is the conditional mean of η given µ (see Lemma 1(vi)). In view of
(2.20)–(2.21) wt and rt+1 depend on, respectively, kt and kt+1 so (2.24) is a non-
linear implicit function relating kt+1 to kt and the exogenous variables.
2.2.5 Parameterization and visualization
In order to visualize the main features of the economy we parameterize the model
by selecting plausible values for the structural parameters—see Table 2.1. We follow
Heijdra and Reijnders (2012) in the parameterization procedure. First, we postu-
late plausible values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ = 0.7), the
efficiency parameter of capital (ε = 0.275), the annual capital depreciation rate
(δa = 0.06), the annual growth rate of the population (na = 0.01) and the target an-
nual steady-state interest rate (rˆa = 0.05). Using these parameters we can determine
the steady-state (annual) capital-output ratio (Kˆ/Yˆ = ε/(rˆa + δa) = 2.5). Second,
we set the length of each period to be 40 years and compute the values for n, δ and rˆ
(noting that n = (1+na)40− 1, δ = 1− (1− δa)40 and rˆ = (1+ ra)40− 1). Third, we
assume that the mandatory retirement age is 65 years so that λ = 25/40 = 0.625.
In the fourth step, we choose ηL = 0.5, ηH = 1.5, µL = 0.05, µH = 0.95, so that the
average health status is µ¯ = 0.5, average working ability is η¯ = 1, and the variances
are σ2η = 0.0833 and σ2η = 0.0675. By setting ξ = 4 we ensure that there is a strong
correlation between health and ability, i.e. cor(µ, η) = 0.300.2 In the fifth step we
choose Ω0 such that yˆ = 10 in the initial steady state. This also pins down the
steady state values for kˆ and wˆ. In the final step the discount factor β is used as a
calibration parameter, i.e. it is set at the value such that the steady-state version of
the fundamental difference equation (2.24) is satisfied. To interpret the value of β in
Table 2.1, note that the annual rate of time preference is ρa = β−1/40 − 1 = 0.0204
(a little over two percent per annum).
The main features of the steady-state FI equilibrium are reported in column
(a) of Table 2.2. Consistent with the calibration procedure, output per efficiency
unit of labour is equal to ten (yˆ = 10) whilst the steady-state interest rate is five
percent on an annual basis (rˆa = 0.05). The steady-state capital intensity equals
kˆ = 0.395. Ownership of the capital stock is highly uneven due to the fact that
individuals differ in terms of labour productivity. Indeed, as is noted in the table,
the first ability quartile of agents (averaged over all survival rates) owns 12.34% of
the capital stock. In contrast, the top ability quartile owns 39.12% of the economy’s
stock of capital.
Steady-state consumption (per efficiency unit of labour) by the young and sur-
2The positive correlation between health and income (or productivity) is mentioned by many
authors in the literature on annuities—see, for example, Walliser (2000), Brunner and Pech (2008),
Direr (2010), and Cremer et al. (2010). Firm empirical evidence on this correlation is, however,
hard to come by. In a recent paper Chetty et al. (2016) employ US data for the period 2001-2014
and find that the gap in life expectancy between the richest and poorest 1% of individuals was 14.6
years for men and 10.1 years for women. In our calibration the expected lifetime at birth of the
bottom and top 1% individuals (by productivity) are 54.65 and 65.35.
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Table 2.1: Structural parameters
σ intertemporal substitution elasticity 0.7000
ε capital efficiency parameter 0.2750
δa annual capital depreciation rate 0.0600
δ capital depreciation factor 0.9158
na population growth rate 0.0100
n population growth factor 0.4889
β time preference parameter c 0.4462
λ mandatory retirement parameter 0.6250
Ω0 scale factor production function c 12.9071
µL survival rate of the unhealthiest 0.0500
µH survival rate of the healthiest 0.9500
ηL lowest working ability 0.5000
ηH highest working ability 1.5000
ξ covariance parameter of the distribution function 4.0000
Note The parameters labelled ‘c’ are calibrated as is explained in the text. The
remaining parameters are postulated a priori. The values for δ and n follow from,
respectively, δa and na, by noting that each model period represents 40 years.
















µCˆo (µ, η)h(µ, η)dµdη
]
. (2.26)
Inequality due to heterogeneous productivity also shows up in the consumption
levels during youth and old-age. The two lowest-ability quartiles enjoy a modest and
declining share of total consumption over the life-cycle due to the positive correlation
between health and ability. The opposite holds for the two highest-ability quartiles.
Finally, Table 2.2 also reports some welfare indicators. Not surprisingly we find that
expected lifetime utility is lowest for individuals with low ability and poor health
(µL, ηL) and highest for those lucky ones with high ability and excellent health
(µH , ηH).3
In Figure 2.3 we depict the steady-state profiles for youth consumption, old-
age consumption, annuity demand, and expected utility. These profiles have been
3By scaling steady-state output such that yˆ = 10 for the FI case we avoid the counterintuitive
feature noted by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, p. 321) that lifetime utility is decreasing in the
survival probability.
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Table 2.2: Allocation and welfare
(a) FI (b) AI (c) SAA (d) SAA (e) SAB (f) SAB (g) SAC (h) SAC
θ = 0.010 θ = 0.025 θ = 0.010 θ = 0.025 θ = 0.010 θ = 0.025
yˆ 10.000 9.840 9.776 9.680 9.768 9.668 9.762 9.660
kˆ 0.395 0.373 0.364 0.351 0.363 0.350 0.362 0.349
%Q1 12.34 11.78 10.15 7.73 9.69 6.69 9.15 5.50
%Q2 19.81 19.46 17.14 13.59 16.90 12.98 16.75 12.60
%Q3 28.73 28.84 25.81 21.05 25.92 21.26 26.12 21.66
%Q4 39.12 39.93 36.18 30.11 36.74 31.46 37.22 32.58
%SAS 10.72 27.51 10.74 27.60 10.76 27.67
rˆ 6.04 6.34 6.47 6.66 6.48 6.69 6.50 6.70
rˆa 5.00% 5.11% 5.16% 5.22% 5.16% 5.23% 5.17% 5.24%
wˆ 7.250 7.134 7.087 7.018 7.082 7.010 7.077 7.003
B̂C 0.00% 5.83% 10.03% 17.66% 10.63% 19.33% 10.63% 19.33%
ˆ¯rp 10.18 10.12 9.99 10.12 9.98 10.12 9.96
ˆ¯µp 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.70
ÂS 1.31 1.34 1.39 1.35 1.40 1.35 1.41
cˆy 5.357 5.296 5.270 5.233 5.268 5.228 5.265 5.225
%Q1 15.99 16.03 16.02 15.98 16.06 16.09 16.12 16.20
%Q2 22.10 22.13 22.12 22.10 22.14 22.16 22.16 22.20
%Q3 28.06 28.05 28.05 28.06 28.04 28.04 28.02 27.99
%Q4 33.85 33.79 33.81 33.86 33.75 33.72 33.70 33.61
cˆo 4.087 4.021 3.994 3.954 3.991 3.949 3.988 3.946
%Q1 12.23 10.70 10.72 10.77 10.77 10.93 10.83 11.14
%Q2 19.74 18.78 18.79 18.82 18.82 18.90 18.83 18.95
%Q3 28.75 29.04 29.03 29.02 29.02 28.98 29.00 28.91
%Q4 39.28 41.48 41.46 41.39 41.39 41.18 41.33 41.00
EΛˆ(µL, ηL) 1.014 0.996 0.989 0.978 1.022 1.020 1.026 1.029
EΛˆ(µH , ηL) 1.433 1.471 1.468 1.463 1.260 1.261 1.266 1.276
EΛˆ(µL, ηH) 1.529 1.517 1.513 1.506 1.532 1.527 1.531 1.525
EΛˆ(µH , ηH) 2.143 2.167 2.164 2.161 2.031 2.026 2.030 2.024
Note Here %Qj denotes the share accounted for by skill quartile j (averaged over
all survival rates) of the variable directly above it. %SAS is the share owned by
the social annuity system. EΛˆ(µi, ηj) gives expected utility for an agent with health
type µi and skill type ηi. B̂C is the proportion of the population facing borrowing
constraints. ÂS is an indicator for the severity of adverse selection in the private
annuity market.
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Figure 2.3: Steady-state profiles
(a) Youth consumption (b) Old-age consumption
Cˆy(µ) Cˆo(µ)


























(c) Annuity demand (d) Expected utility
Aˆp(µ) EΛˆ(µ)























Legend The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles for the full information (FI)
case featuring perfect annuities. The dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asym-
metric information (AI) case in which adverse selection results in a single pooling
rate of interest on annuities, r¯pt+1. In the AI case agents with poor health face bind-
ing borrowing constraints regardless of their productivity in the labour market.
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In panel (a) we find that Cˆy(µ) is increasing in µ. This result is the opposite of
the findings reported by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, p. 321) who assume that
all individuals have the same labour productivity (i.e., σ2η = 0 in their model).
In our model, for a given productivity level η, youth consumption is decreasing in
the survival probability (see Figure 2.2). But as a result of the positive correlation
between η and µ, healthy agents also tend to be wealthy agents who consume more







decreasing in µ but the Γ1(µ) term is increasing in µ (see Lemma 1(vi))). Due to
the strong correlation between µ and η the latter effect dominates the former, thus
ensuring that Cˆy(µ) is increasing in the survival probability.
As panel (b) shows, the profile for old-age consumption Cˆo(µ) is also increasing
in µ. Again this result is reversed if all agents feature the same labour productivity,
as can be easily verified with the aid of Figure 2.2. In panel (c) we find that Aˆp(µ) is







is increasing in µ. Finally, as panel (d) illustrates, EΛˆ(µ)
is increasing in the survival probability. Intuitively, for a given productivity level
η individual lifetime utility is increasing in µ (people like surviving into old-age).
Furthermore, µ and η are positively correlated thus strengthening the positive link
between utility and health.
2.3 Informational asymmetry in the private annu-
ity market
In the previous section we have studied the steady state of an economy populated by
heterogeneous individuals facing longevity risk and differing in terms of their innate
labour productivity. With full information about the health status of individuals,
annuity firms can effectively segment the market for private annuities and offer
these insurance products at a price that is actuarially fair for all individuals. In
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this section we study the less pristine—and arguably much more realistic—scenario
under which information regarding a person’s health is not perfectly observable by
insurance firms. Indeed, from here on we drop Assumption (A0) and replace it by
the following alternative assumptions:
(A3) Health status and productivity are private information of the annuitant. The
distribution of health and productivity types in the population, H(µ, η), is
common knowledge.
(A4) Annuitants can buy multiple annuities for different amounts and from differ-
ent annuity firms. Individual annuity firms cannot monitor their clients’ wage
income or annuity holdings with other firms.
As is explained by Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, pp. 325–6), in this Asymmetric
Information case (abbreviated as AI) the market for private annuities is character-
ized by a pooling equilibrium. In this equilibrium there is a single pooled annuity
rate, r¯pt+1, which applies to all purchasers of private annuities. Lacking information
about an individual’s health and productivity, the annuity company cannot obtain
full information revelation by setting both price and quantity. As a result, Pauly’s
(1974) linear pricing concept is the relevant one.4 A second feature of the pooling
equilibrium is that there typically are unhealthy agents who drop out of the annuity
market altogether and face binding borrowing constraints. Indeed, since an individ-
ual’s human wealth is proportional to his/her labour productivity, and individual
consumption is decreasing in the survival rate, there may exist a cut-off survival
probability, µbct , below which individuals would like to go short on annuities. But
this is impossible because in doing so they would reveal their poor health status
and obtain an offer they cannot possibly accept from annuity firms (more on this
below).5
The pooled annuity rate, r¯pt+1, is determined as follows. We assume that the cut-
off health type is µbct such that consumers with health type µL ≤ µ < µbct purchase
no annuities. Net savers feature a survival probability such that µbct ≤ µ ≤ µH and




















where 1 + rt+1 is the gross rate of return on physical capital, 1 + r¯pt+1 is the gross
rate of return on private annuities, Lt(µ, η) is the density of type (µ, η) consumers
4See also Abel (1986), Walliser (2000), Palmon and Spivak (2007), and Sheshinski (2008) on
linear pricing of annuities.
5Villeneuve formulates a partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous survival rates (and iden-
tical labour productivity). He argues that only one insurance market can be active at any time,
i.e. either the annuity market or the life-insurance market is active but not both. If there is no
demand for life insurance in the full information case—as is the case in our model of the closed
economy—then adverse selection in the market for private annuities cannot result in the activation
of the life insurance market (2003, p. 534).
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in period t, and Apt (µ, η) is the density of private annuities that is purchased by
such agents. The gross returns from the annuity savings of all annuitants in period
t (left-hand side of (2.31)) are redistributed to the surviving annuitants in the form
of insurance claims in period t + 1 (right-hand side of (2.31)). It follows that the
pooling rate equals:















Apt (µ, η)h(µ, η)dµdη
. (2.33)
In view of the fact that the asset-weighted survival rate is such that µbct < µ¯pt <
µH < 1, it follows from (2.32) that r¯pt+1 exceeds rt+1 so that all net savers will
completely annuitize their wealth. Hence, Yaari’s (1965) classic result also holds in
the pooled annuity market.
The pooling rate (2.32) is demographically unfair because it is based on the asset-
weighted survival rate µ¯pt rather than on the average survival rate in the population
µ¯. The demographically fair pooling rate is given by:




and, since µ¯ < µ¯pt (see Appendix B), it follows readily from the comparison of (2.32)
and (2.34) that r¯pt+1 < r¯dft+1. In our numerical exercise we follow Walliser (2000,
p. 380) by constructing an adverse selection index AS t (or ‘load factor’) which









As a result of adverse selection in the private annuity market, AS t exceeds unity.
Furthermore, the larger is AS t, the more severe is the adverse selection problem.
Under the maintained assumption that µL < µbct < µH , there are two types of
agents in the economy. Individuals with a relatively low survival probability (µL ≤
µ < µbct ) will face a binding borrowing constraint, whilst healthier individuals (µbct ≤
µ ≤ µH) will be net savers. It follows that constrained individuals simply consume
their endowment incomes in the two periods:
Cyt (µ, η) = wt(η), (2.36)
Cot+1(µ, η) = λwt+1(η). (2.37)
For unconstrained individuals the consolidated budget constraint in a pooled annuity
market is given by:
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where r¯pt+1 is the pooling rate of interest. Such consumers choose Cyt (µ, η) and
Cot+1(µ, η) in order to maximize expected lifetime utility (2.2) subject to the bud-
get constraint (2.38). The optimal consumption plans and annuity demand are fully
characterized by:














































where we have used the expression for the pooled annuity rate as given in (2.32).
The optimal consumption choices of different types of consumers are illustrated
in Figure 2.4. Just as for the FI case we only illustrate the choices made by the
four extreme types, unhealthy and healthy lowest-skilled (µL, ηL) and (µH , ηL), and
unhealthy and healthy highest-skilled (µL, ηH) and (µH , ηH). In view of (2.38) the
location of an individual’s lifetime budget constraint only depends on the person’s
productivity level, so that LBC(ηL) and LBC(ηH) are parallel. As before the in-
come endowment line is given by IEL, so that the two relevant endowment points
are given by, respectively, points EL and EH . The consumption Euler equation for
unconstrained consumers operating in a pooled annuity market is given by:
U ′(Cyt (µ, η))








(1 + rt+1), (2.42)
where we have used (2.32) to get from the first to the second equality. Using the
CRRA felicity function stated in (2.3), we easily find that the Euler equation is a
straight line from the origin with a slope that depends positively on µ. In Figure 2.4
we have drawn the Euler equations as MRSC(µH) and MRSC(µL). Since MRSC(µH)
lies to the left of IEL, points B and D denote the optimal (unconstrained) consump-
tion points for, respectively, the lowest-skilled and highest-skilled consumers. In con-
trast, since MRSC(µL) lies to the right of IEL, points A and C are infeasible as they
would involve going short on annuities. It follows that all lowest-health individuals
face borrowing constraints. Furthermore, the Euler equation (2.42) that coincides




(1 + rt+1)βU ′(λwt+1(η))
. (2.43)
Unconstrained consumers are located in the area ELBDEH whilst constrained indi-
viduals are bunched on the line segment ELEH . It is worth noting that µbct depends
on the current and future capital intensity in the economy via factor prices. Given
the specification of preferences and technology, however, µbct does not depend on η
itself.
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Legend LBC(ηj) is the lifetime budget constraint for an individual with productiv-
ity ηj . IEL is the income endowment line and agents are located on the line segment
ELEH . MRSC(µi) is the consumption Euler equation for an individual with sur-
vival rate µi facing a pooled annuity rate of interest r¯pt+1. For individuals with
µbct ≤ µ ≤ µH optimal consumption is located at the intersection of MRSC(µi) and
LBC(ηj). All other individuals face borrowing constraints and consume along ELEH .
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In the presence of binding borrowing constraints, the capital accumulation iden-






Apt (µ, η)h(µ, η)dηdµ. (2.44)
By substituting the demand for annuities (2.41) into (2.44) we obtain the funda-























where Γ1(µ) is the conditional mean of η (defined in Lemma 1(vi) above), and the
factor prices follow from (2.20)–(2.21).
The main features of the steady-state AI equilibrium are reported in column (b)
of Table 2.2. As a result of asymmetric information in the annuity market, output
per efficiency unit of labour drops by 1.60% (yˆ = 9.840) whilst the steady-state
capital intensity falls by 5.71% (kˆ = 0.373). The decrease in the capital intensity
causes the annual interest rate to rise by 12 basis points (rˆa = 5.11%) and the wage
rate to fall by 1.60%. So despite the fact that only 5.83% of young individuals face
binding borrowing constraints (see B̂C), the macroeconomic effects of information
asymmetry are far from trivial in size. The adverse selection index, as defined in
(2.35) above, equals ÂS = 1.31 and the asset-weighted average survival rate of
annuitants equals ˆ¯µp = 0.66. Finally, as the welfare indicators at the bottom of
Table 2.2 reveal, under asymmetric information unhealthy individuals are worse
off while their healthy cohort members are better off than under the FI case. The
information asymmetry redistributes resources from unhealthy to healthy agents.
In Figure 2.3 we depict with dashed lines the steady-state profiles for youth
consumption, old-age consumption, annuity demand, and expected utility. Just as
for the FI case these profiles have been averaged over η:
Cˆy(µ) =
[







































where IAI(µ) = 0 for µL ≤ µ < µˆbc and IAI(µ) = 1 for µˆbc ≤ µ ≤ µH . In panel
(a) we find that youth consumption Cˆy(µ) is increasing in µ. Interestingly, for µ
close to µˆbc youth consumption is higher under AI than for the FI case. Young
individuals facing borrowing constraints are unable to smooth consumption in the
AI case and just consume their endowment income. Net savers featuring a survival
probability close to µˆbc purchase virtually no annuities at all as the pooling rate
is unattractive to them—see panel (c). For higher levels of µ annuity demands are
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higher and saving for old-age increases. In panel (b) we show that the healthiest
agents consume more during old-age under AI compared to FI. In panel (d) we find
that the healthiest individuals are actually better off under AI than under FI. The
information asymmetry benefits such individuals.
2.4 Public annuities to the rescue?
In the adverse selection economy studied in the previous section relatively unhealthy
annuitants face a disadvantageous pooling rate of interest on their annuities. In
essence such individuals are subsidizing their healthy cohort members through the
annuity market. Following Abel (1987) we now extend our model by introducing a
fully-funded mandatory social security system that is run by the government.6 Such a
system is immune to adverse selection because all individuals are forced to participate
in it—the government possesses the power to tax. In particular, every individual pays
a social security tax θ (such that 0 < θ < 1) and receives a retirement pension upon
surviving into old-age. We assume that the pension contribution is proportional to
wage income. Like the private sector, the government cannot observe an individual’s
health status though it can measure a person’s income. It follows that the pension
contribution can be written as Ast (η) = θwt(η). Total pension contributions amount
to Ast = θη¯wtLt and are invested in the capital market earning a gross rate of return
equal to 1 + rt+1. In the next period the returns Rt+1 = (1 + rt+1)Ast are paid out
to surviving agents. Under this funded pension system redistribution takes place
between agents of the same birth cohort (from those who die to survivors). Hence,
social security plays the role of public annuities. In this section we consider three
prototypical types of pension systems. The difference lies in the method in which
the returns are distributed to surviving individuals.
• Pension system A: pension receipts during old-age are proportional to contri-
butions made during youth.
• Pension system B: pension contributions of η types are distributed during old-
age to surviving η types.
• Pension system C: pension receipts are the same in absolute value for all sur-
viving agents.
2.4.1 Pension system A
Under system A pension receipts are given by:
Rst+1(η) = ζθwt(η), (2.49)
6There is one important difference in that Abel (1987) restricts attention to the full information
(FI) case in which perfect private annuities are available. In order not to unduly interrupt the flow
of the paper, we present the FI results for our model in Appendix C.
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where ζ is a parameter to be determined below. The clearing condition for the public









The left-hand side of this expression is the total amount to be distributed to sur-
vivors and the right-hand side represents total pension payments. By substituting
(2.49) into (2.50) and noting that wt(η) = ηwt and Lt(µ, η) = Lth(µ, η) we find the




, ζA ≡ η¯µ¯
cov (η, µ) + η¯µ¯
, (2.51)
where µ¯ is the average survival rate of the population and ζA is a constant (featuring
0 < ζA < 1 because cov (η, µ) is positive). It follows from (2.51) that under pension
system A the rate of return on social annuities falls short of the demographically
fair social annuity yield, (1+rt+1)/µ¯, because health and productivity are positively
correlated. Intuitively, the high contributors (featuring a high η) tend to live longer
than average.
Just as in the adverse selection economy studied in the previous section individ-
uals can buy private annuities in the pooled annuity market but some agents will
face borrowing constraint. Constrained individuals simply consume their endowment
incomes in the two periods:
Cyt (µ, η) = (1− θ)wt(η), (2.52)
Cot+1(µ, η) = λwt+1(η) +R
s
t+1(η). (2.53)
For unconstrained individuals the consolidated budget constraint in the presence of
a pooled annuity market is given by:
Cyt (µ, η) +
Cot+1(µ, η)
1 + r¯pt+1






where r¯pt+1 is the pooling rate of interest. The pension system reduces current wage
income but increases future income. Consumers choose Cyt (µ, η) and Cot+1(µ, η) in
order to maximize expected lifetime utility (2.2) subject to the budget constraint
(2.54). The optimal consumption plans and annuity demands are fully characterized
Chapter 2 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
by:




























































where we have used the expression for the pooled annuity rate as given in (2.32).
The social annuity system affects an individual’s human wealth at birth (the term
in square brackets on the right-hand side of (2.55)) but it is not a priori clear in









On the one hand, with a positive correlation between health and ability ζA is such
that 0 < ζA < 1. On the other hand, the survival rate of private annuitants exceeds
the population-wide average survival rate, i.e. µ¯pt /µ¯ > 1. It thus follows that θnt
is ambiguous in sign. In this paper we focus on the case for which θnt is negative
so that, ceteris paribus factor prices and the pooled survival rate, human wealth is
increased as a result of the public pension system.7
The optimal consumption choices can be explained with the aid of Figure 2.5.
To facilitate the comparison with the AI case we keep factor prices and the pooled
survival rate at the levels for that case. Hence the diagram shows the partial equi-
librium effects on individual choices of the introduction of a pension system. The
dashed lines correspond to the AI case. As a result of the public pension system the
lifetime budget constraints shift outward (because θnt < 0), more so the higher is η.
The income endowment line rotates in a counter-clockwise fashion. Unconstrained
individuals increase consumption during youth and old-age. In contrast, constrained
individuals are forced to consume less during youth. Such agents are bunched along
the line segment ELEH . Just as for the AI case there is a single cut-off value for the










7In the numerical simulations ζA = 0.9569 and µ¯ = 0.5. Hence the effective pension contribution
is negative for any µ¯pt exceeding µ¯/ζA = 0.5225. This condition is easily satisfied. See also Figure
2.9(c) for an illustration of effective contribution rates under the different pension systems.
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Legend LBC(ηj) is the lifetime budget constraint for an individual with productiv-
ity ηj . IEL is the income endowment line and agents are located on the line segment
ELEH . MRSC(µi) is the consumption Euler equation for an individual with sur-
vival rate µi facing a pooled annuity rate of interest r¯pt+1. For individuals with
µbct ≤ µ ≤ µH optimal consumption is located at the intersection of MRSC(µi) and
LBC(ηj). All other individuals face borrowing constraints and consume along ELEH .
The dashed lines visualize the corresponding schedules for the AI case. Factor prices
are held the same for SA and AI to facilitate the comparison.
Because wages and pension receipts are proportional to η and the felicity function is
homothetic, it follows from (2.59) that µbct does not depend on η. As is clear from the
diagram, the introduction of public pensions will increase the population fraction of
people facing borrowing constraints.
In order to glean the general equilibrium effects of introducing a public pension
system we must formulate the capital accumulation identity. Since public and private









Apt (µ, η)h(µ, η)dηdµ
]
. (2.60)
By substituting the demand for annuities (2.57) into (2.60) we obtain the funda-
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where Γ1(µ) is the conditional mean of η (defined in Lemma 1(vi) above), and the
factor prices follow from (2.20)–(2.21).
The main features of the steady-state equilibrium with pension system A (labeled
SA) are reported in columns (c)-(d) of Table 2.2. In column (c) the contribution
rate equals θ = 0.010 which means that the system is relatively small as the income
replacement rate during retirement, ξSA ≡ θζA(1 + rˆ)/[(1 − λ)µ¯], is only about
0.3812. In column (d) the contribution rate equals θ = 0.025 which results in a large
pension system, i.e. ξSA = 0.9776. Comparing columns (b) and (d) we find that
output per efficiency unit of labour drops by 1.62% (yˆ = 9.680) whilst the steady-
state capital intensity falls by 5.76% (kˆ = 0.351). As a result of the decrease in the
capital intensity, the annual interest rate rises by 11 basis points (rˆa = 5.22%) whilst
the wage rate falls by 1.6%. The proportion of constrained individual rises from
5.83% to 17.66%. The adverse selection index, as defined in (2.35) above, increases
to ÂS = 1.39 and the asset-weighted average survival rate of annuitants rises to
ˆ¯µp = 0.70. Despite the fact that the rate of return on capital increases, the return
on private annuities decreases slightly because the pooled survival rate ˆ¯µp increases
by more. Finally, as the welfare indicators at the bottom of Table 2.2 reveal, under
pension system A all individuals are worse off compared to the AI case. The pension
system crowds out capital and exacerbates the adverse selection problem in the
market for private annuities.
In Figure 2.6 we use solid lines to depict the profiles for youth and old-age


































































where ISA(µ) = 0 for µL ≤ µ < µˆbc and IAI(µ) = 1 for µˆbc ≤ µ ≤ µH . The dashed
lines in Figure 2.6 correspond to the profiles for the AI case. Youth consumption,
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Figure 2.6: Steady-state profiles under pension system A
(a) Youth consumption (b) Old-age consumption
Cˆy(µ) Cˆo(µ)




















(c) Annuity demand (d) Expected utility
Aˆp(µ) EΛˆ(µ)





















Legend The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles under pension system A
(SA), and the dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asymmetric information (AI)
case without pensions. In both cases adverse selection results in a single pooling rate
of interest on annuities, r¯pt+1, and agents with poor health face binding borrowing
constraints. The SA case has been drawn for a large system featuring θ = 0.025.
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annuity demand, and lifetime utility are all lower under SA than under AI. Old-age
consumption is higher under AI for most borrowing constrained individuals.
2.4.2 Pension system B
Under pension system B the government uses information on a person’s wage income
to deduce that individual’s innate ability. It uses its knowledge of η by setting pension
receipts according to the following rule:
Rst+1(η) = ζ(η)θwt(η), (2.65)
where ζ(η) is a function to be determined below. For each ability level η, the budget








The left-hand side of this expression is the total amount to be distributed to type
η survivors whilst the right-hand side represents total pension payments to such
individuals. Under this system public annuities are such that longevity risk is shared
among individuals of the same productivity type. By substituting (2.65) into (2.66)





, ζB(η) ≡ µ¯
µ¯+ ξσ2µ(η − η¯)
. (2.67)
For relatively productive individuals (featuring η > η¯) the rate of return on social
annuities falls short of the actuarially fair social annuity yield, (1+ rt+1)/µ¯, because
such people tend to have a relatively high survival rate. In contrast, for relatively
unproductive individuals (with η < η¯) the rate of return on social annuities is better
than the actuarially fair social annuity yield because such people tend to have a
relatively low survival rate.
Individuals facing a binding borrowing constraint consume according to (2.52)–
(2.53) with Rst+1(η) as stated in (2.65) and (2.67). For unconstrained individuals the
optimal consumption plans and annuity demands are fully characterized by:
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Legend LBC(ηj) is the lifetime budget constraint for an individual with productiv-
ity ηj . IEL is the income endowment line and agents are located on the line segment
ELEH . MRSC(µi) is the consumption Euler equation for an individual with survival
rate µi facing a pooled annuity rate of interest r¯pt+1. The dashed and dotted lines
visualize the corresponding schedules for the AI and SA cases respectively. Factor
prices are held the same for SB and AI to facilitate the comparison. An individual
with productivity ηj faces borrowing constraints if µ < µbct (ηj) and is unconstrained
otherwise.
where we have substituted wt(η) = ηwt and used the expression for the pooled
annuity rate as given in (2.32).
The optimal consumption choices can be explained with the aid of Figure 2.7.
Just as before we focus on the four extreme types. The solid lines depict the sit-
uation under pension system B. For purposes of reference the dashed lines in the
diagram represent the AI case (without pensions) whilst the thin dotted lines rep-
resent the SA case. We keep factor prices constant at their AI levels. Under pension
system B the IEL pivots around some point C on the old IEL line for the SA case.
Intuitively this is because system B incorporates explicit redistribution from high-
ability to low-ability individuals and, as a result of the positive correlation between
ability and health, implicit redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals.
With asymmetric information in the private annuity market the pooling equilibrium
causes a redistribution of resources from unhealthy to healthy individuals, i.e. from
people who tend to be poor to individuals who tend to be rich. Pension system A
does nothing to redress this phenomenon. In contrast, under system B the high-
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skilled get a lower return on social annuities than the low-skilled do, so there is some
redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals via that channel.
As is marked in the diagram, lowest-ability types experience borrowing constraint
for µ < µbct (ηL) whilst highest-ability individuals experience such constraints for µ <
µbct (ηH), where µbct (ηH) < µbct (ηL). Mathematically, an individual with productivity
η experiences a binding borrowing constraint if his/her survival probability falls










Despite the fact that the felicity function is homothetic and wages are proportional
to η, µbct depends on η because productivity features nonlinearly in ζB(η).
In Figure 2.8 we illustrate the relationship between ability η and the critical
survival rate µbct (η). The thin solid line represents the AI case for which µˆbc = 0.1028
and 5.83% of agents are constrained. The dashed line depicts the situation for the SA
case (with θ = 0.025) for which µˆbc = 0.2090 and 17.66% of agents are constrained.
Finally, the thick solid line in Figure 2.8 illustrates the SB case. As is predicted by the
theory there is a downward sloping relationship between η and µˆbc. For the lowest-
ability types the cut-off value equals 0.2590 whereas it is equal to 0.1902 for the
highest-ability individuals. So by engaging in redistribution from high-ability to low-
ability individuals the policy maker worsens the incidence of borrowing constraints
to the latter types.
In Figure 2.9 we compare some features of pension systems A and B. Panel (a)
depicts the fair-rates shares ζA (a constant) and ζB(η) (downward sloping because
of redistribution). Panel (b) shows that pensions receipts are increasing in ability for
both systems. In panel (c) we depict the effective pension contribution rate θnt (η).
Under system A this is a negative constant, but under system B the effective rate is
increasing in ability:








For our parameterization θnt (η) remains negative for all ability levels, although barely
so for the highest-ability types.








Apt (µ, η)h(µ, η)dηdµ
]
, (2.73)
where µbct (η) is determined in (2.71) and is illustrated in Figure 2.8. By substituting
the demand for annuities (2.70) into (2.73) we obtain the fundamental difference
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Figure 2.8: Ability and borrowing constraints











Legend Under pension systems B and C the critical level of the survival rate
below which borrowing constraints become active, µbct (η), depends negatively on the
individual’s productivity η. In Figure 2.7 the income endowment points no longer
lie along a ray from the origin.
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Figure 2.9: Comparing pension systems






































(c) Effective pension contribution rate
θnt (η)















Legend The fair-rate share ζi(η) measures the individual’s gross yield on social
annuities under pension system i expressed as a share of the actuarially fair yield,
(1+r¯pt+1)/µ¯. A negative value for the effective pension contribution rate θnt (η) implies
that the pension system makes individuals wealthier in a partial equilibrium sense.
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The main features of the steady-state equilibrium with a small and large pension
system B (labeled SB) are reported in, respectively, columns (e) and (f) of Table
2.2. We focus attention at the large pension system featuring θ = 0.025. Comparing
columns (b) and (f) we find that output per efficiency unit of labour drops by 1.74%
(yˆ = 9.668) whilst the steady-state capital intensity falls by 6.19% (kˆ = 0.350). As
a result of the decrease in the capital intensity, the annual interest rate rises by 12
basis points (rˆa = 5.23%) whilst the wage rate falls by 1.74%. The proportion of
constrained individual rises from 5.83% to 19.33%. The adverse selection index, as
defined in (2.35) above, increases to ÂS = 1.40, the asset-weighted average survival
rate of annuitants rises to ˆ¯µp = 0.70, and the return on private annuities decreases
slightly to ˆ¯rp = 9.98. Finally, as the welfare indicators at the bottom of Table 2.2
reveal, under pension system B poor-health individuals are better off compared to the
AI case as a result of the redistributionary feature of system B. The opposite holds
for the healthy agents. Even though the policy maker cannot observe an individual’s
health status, by including a redistributionary component in the public pension
system, the unhealthiest in society are aided somewhat.
In Figure 2.10 we present the η-averaged profiles for consumption during youth
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where ISB(µ, η) = 0 if Aˆp(µ, η) < 0 and ISB(µ, η) = 1 if Aˆp(µ, η) ≥ 0.8 The profiles
for SB and SA (in Figure 2.6) are very similar.
2.4.3 Pension system C
The final case we consider is pension system C under which the government engages
in more extreme redistribution from the rich to the poor (than under system B) by




where R¯st+1 is to be determined below. The clearing condition for the public pension
system is given in this case by:






8Using Figure 2.7 the indicator function ISB(µ, η) can be characterized a bit further. For µL ≤
µ < µˆbc(ηH) all individuals are constrained, i.e. ISB(µ, η) = 0 for all η ∈ [ηL, ηH ]. Similarly,
for µˆbc(ηL) ≤ µ < µH all individuals are unconstrained, i.e. ISB(µ, η) = 1 for all η ∈ [ηL, ηH ].
Finally, for µˆbc(ηH) ≤ µ ≤ µˆbc(ηL) we define the critical level of η at which borrowing constraints
cease to bind, i.e. ηˆbc(µ) is the inverse function of µˆbc(η) in that domain. Then ISB(µ, η) = 0 for
ηL ≤ η < ηˆbc(µ) and ISB(µ, η) = 1 for ηˆbc(µ) ≤ η ≤ ηH .
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Figure 2.10: Steady-state profiles under pension system B
(a) Youth consumption (b) Old-age consumption
Cˆy(µ) Cˆo(µ)




















(c) Annuity demand (d) Expected utility
Aˆp(µ) EΛˆ(µ)





















Legend The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles under pension system B
(SB), and the dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asymmetric information (AI)
case without pensions. In both cases adverse selection results in a single pooling rate
of interest on annuities, r¯pt+1, and agents with poor health face binding borrowing
constraints. The SB case has been drawn for a large system featuring θ = 0.025.
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Expressing the pension receipt in terms of the contribution made during youth we




, ζC(η) ≡ η¯
η
. (2.81)
See Figure 2.9 for features of pension system C. It follows from (2.81) that for
individuals with above-average productivity, η > η¯, the rate of return on social
annuities falls short of the actuarially fair social annuity yield, (1 + rt+1)/µ¯. In
contrast, below-average individuals get a better-than actuarially fair rate on the
pension contributions. Intuitively these results follow from the fact that the pension
system redistributes resources from productive to less productive agents.
Qualitatively system C is very similar to system B (in that both feature redis-
tribution for healthy to unhealthy agents) and the key expressions characterizing
system C can be obtained by replacing ζB(η) with ζC(η) in equations (2.68)–(2.77).
The main features of system C are the following. First, the comparison of columns
(b) and (g) in Table 2.2 reveals that output and wages fall by 1.83% (yˆ = 9.660) and
the capital intensity drops by 6.49% (kˆ = 0.349). Out of the three pension systems
considered, system C features the largest macroeconomic effects. Redistribution is
macroeconomically costly. Second, from Figure 2.9 it is clear that pension system C
indeed features the highest degree of redistribution from healthy to unhealthy indi-
viduals. Indeed, as can be observed in panel (c) the effective contribution rate θnt (η)
becomes positive for the most healthy individuals. Such individuals experience the
pension system as a tax burden. Third, as is shown in Figure 2.8 low-ability types
are affected most severely by borrowing constraints under pension system C. Finally,
the individual η-averaged profiles for consumption, annuity demands, and utility are
depicted in Figure 2.11. These profiles are very similar to the ones we found for
system B.
2.5 Privatizing social security
The key message of the previous section is loud and clear. The mandatory funded
pension systems that we have studied are immune to adverse selection by design but
they exacerbate the adverse selection problem in the market for private annuities,
increase the fraction of borrowing-constrained (‘over-annuitized’) individuals in the
population, and lead to long-run crowding out of capital and substantial output
losses. This begs the following question: is it better to privatize social security alto-
gether and to allow individuals to insure against longevity risk in the private annuity
market even though this market is not perfect? Referring to Table 2.2 we find that
abolishing the large pension system A (featuring θ = 0.025) would increase output
by 1.65% in the long run. In addition, it would increase steady-state welfare of all
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Figure 2.11: Steady-state profiles under pension system C
(a) Youth consumption (b) Old-age consumption
Cˆy(µ) Cˆo(µ)




















(c) Annuity demand (d) Expected utility
Aˆp(µ) EΛˆ(µ)





















Legend The solid lines depict the steady-state profiles under pension system C
(SC), and the dashed lines visualize the profiles for the asymmetric information (AI)
case without pensions. In both cases adverse selection results in a single pooling rate
of interest on annuities, r¯pt+1, and agents with poor health face binding borrowing
constraints. The SC case has been drawn for a large system featuring θ = 0.025.
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corner types in the economy, cf. the information contained in columns (d) and (b).
At least in the long run, privatization is a ‘win-win’ scenario.
Of course, comparing steady states gives only part of the answer. What matters
is whether or not is possible to abolish the funded pension system in a Pareto
improving manner, i.e. is it a ‘win-win’ scenario to all generations? To answer this
question we now study the transitional dynamic effects of abolishing pension system
A. The economy is in the steady state for the SA system with θ = 0.025 and the
capital intensity is equal to kˆSA = 0.351. At shock-time t = 0, the pension system is
abolished so that young individuals do not pay the pension contribution anymore,
i.e. wage income from t = 0 onward equals wt(η) and pensions receipts from period
t = 1 onward are equal to zero, Rst (η) = 0. Of course the old survivors at the time
of the shock receive the pension they saved for, i.e. Rs0(η) > 0.
Figure 2.12 depicts some of the key features of the transition process. Panel
(a) shows that the capital intensity is predetermined at impact but thereafter rises
monotonically to settle at the new steady-state level associated with the AI equi-
librium, kˆAI = 0.373. Panel (b) show the percentage change in youth-consumption
for healthy and unhealthy individuals with the lowest skill level. Interestingly, the
healthy individuals decrease their consumption whilst the unhealthy increase it. The
response of the latter group of people is easy to understand: these individuals were
facing severe borrowing constraints in the SA system (and will continue to do so
to a lesser degree in the AI equilibrium). Because the pension system is abolished
(and θ = 0) they can increase their consumption during youth and reduce the de-
gree of overannuitization. Note that in panel (c) the overannuitization faced by the
unhealthy is illustrated by the dramatic fall in old-age consumption for period t = 1
(when the surviving shock-time young are old) and beyond. Finally, in panel (d)
we show that there is a strong increase in the demand for private annuities by the
healthy agents.9 There is virtually no transitional dynamics in µbct which falls from
µˆbc = 0.2090 to µbc0 = 0.1026 and thereafter settles at µˆbc = 0.1025. It follows that
all agents featuring µ < 0.1025 face borrowing constraints during youth no matter
when they are born.
In Figure 2.13 we illustrate the effects on lifetime welfare for the four corner
types in the economy, i.e. (µL, ηL), (µL, ηH), (µH , ηL), and (µH , ηH). Regardless
of when they are born and irrespective of their productivity level, the unhealthiest
individuals are better off as a result of the pension abolishment. Expected lifetime
utility rises over time so for all corner types the gain is higher the later they are born.
Interestingly, healthy agents born at the time of the shock are worse off than they
would have been under the SA system. Privatizing social security is not a ‘win-win’
scenario to all generations.
9Since youth-consumption, private annuity demand, and old-age consumption are linear in η for
both SA and AI systems, it follows that the information in panels (b)-(d) is the same for all values
of η.
44 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
Figure 2.12: Abolishing pension system A




















































Legend At time t = 0 pension system A with a contribution rate of θ = 0.025 is
abolished permanently. The system is initially in the steady state featuring a capital
intensity kˆSA = 0.351. Panel (a): over time the economy converges monotonically to
the steady-state for the AI case with kˆAI = 0.373. Panels (b)-(c) show the percentage
change in, respectively, youth and old-age consumption for an individual of type
(µi, ηL). Panel (d) depicts the percentage change in annuity demand of a person of
type (µH , ηL). See also Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.13: Lifetime utility of corner types
(a) Unhealthy and low productivity (b) Unhealthy and high productivity
EΛt(µL, ηL) EΛt(µL, ηH)




















(c) Healthy and low productivity (d) Healthy and high productivity
EΛt(µH , ηL) EΛt(µH , ηH)


















Legend The solid lines depict the steady-state lifetime utility levels attained by the
different corner types under pension system A (SA) with θ = 0.025. The abolishment
of the pension system occurs at time t = 0 and affects lifetime utility of different
types over time. Unhealthy agents benefit from the policy initiative no matter when
they are born. Healthy individuals born at the time of the shock are worse off as a
result of it.
46 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
2.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter we have developed an overlapping generations model which fea-
tures adverse selection in the private annuity market and endogenously determined
borrowing constraints in the capital market. Consumers are assumed to be heteroge-
neous in two dimensions—working ability and health status—which in the absence
of perfect information leads to adverse selection in the private annuity market. Fur-
thermore, they are restricted from borrowing against their anticipated future wage
income due to the borrowing constraints. We demonstrate numerically that the in-
formational asymmetry matters quantitatively in that, compared to the world with
perfect information, it causes first-order reductions in output per efficiency unit of
labour and the capital intensity. Starting from the benchmark model with adverse
selection we introduce a fully-funded social security system and study its impact
on capital accumulation and individual welfare under three different pension benefit
rules.
We find that the social security system affects both capital accumulation and the
proportion of individuals that are facing borrowing constraints. Capital crowding
out increases and borrowing constraints become more prevalent the larger is the
pension system. Intuitively a social security system causes more consumers to be
over-annuitized and to face borrowing constraints. They cannot undo the effects of
social security by transacting in their private accounts because any attempt to go
short on annuities (demanding life-insured loans) would reveal their health status to
the insurance companies in a world with asymmetric information.
The welfare effects of social security depend both on the pension recipient’s type
and on the specific form of the pension benefit rule. Provided the rule incorporates
some implicit or explicit redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals, the
latter group will actually benefit from the existence of the social security system in
the steady state. In contrast, if pension benefits are proportional to an individual’s
contributions during youth and the proportionality factor is the same for everybody
then the pension system makes everybody worse off in the long run.
A comparison of steady-state equilibria is not a guarantee that the privatization
of social security is Pareto improving for all generations. For example, the simulations
have shown that the abolition of a public pension system featuring a proportional
benefit rule will harm shock-time healthy individuals. Even though all other gener-
ations and types are better off as a result, the privatization does not constitute a
‘win-win’ scenario.
In this Chapter we have intentionally ignored the role of an intentional bequest
motive and its effect on capital accumulation. We are going to study these topics in
later Chapters. Of course, the intention to leave bequests to one’s offspring does affect
an individual’s attitude toward private annuities. Indeed, with an operative bequest
motive, the rational individual will no longer fully annuitize his/her assets. Despite
the high return on private annuities the individual will put aside a certain amount
of unannuitized savings to pass on to their offspring upon death. In future work
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we intend to generalize the heterogeneous-agent model developed here by including
an intentional bequest motive and to study the effects of social security with this
extended framework.
2.A Appendix A
In this appendix we show some important results regarding the bivariate uniform
distribution for µ and η that is employed in this Chapter (see equation (2.1) for the
density function). First we show how to derive it by using the Farly-Morgenstern
Family approach. In doing so we impose that the marginal distribution of µ (denoted
by hµ(µ)) is uniform in the interval [µL, µH ] whilst the one for η (denoted by hη(η))
is uniform in the interval [ηL, ηH ]. It follows that:
hµ(µ) =
{





1/(ηH − ηL) for ηL ≤ η ≤ ηH
0 otherwise. (A.2)

























ηH − ηL . (A.4)
Rice (2007, pp. 77-78) shows that for any parameter α such that |α| < 1 a bivari-
ate distribution H(µ, η) possessing uniform marginal distributions is obtained by
computing:
H(µ, η) = Hµ(µ)Hη(η)
[
1 + α [1−Hµ(µ)] [1−Hη(η)]
]
. (A.5)
Because limµ→µH Hµ(µ) = 1 and limη→ηH Hη(η) = 1 we find that the marginal
distributions resulting from (A.5) are H(µH , η) = Hη(η) and H(µ, ηH) = Hµ(µ).
By using the expression from (A.4) in (A.5) we find that:
H(µ, η) =
(µ− µL)(η − ηL)
(µH − µL)(ηH − ηL)
[
1 + α
(µH − µ)(ηH − η)
(µH − µL)(ηH − ηL)
]
. (A.6)
It follows from (A.6) that the density function, h(µ, η), is given by:




1 + ξ(µ− µ¯)(η − η¯)
(µH − µL)(ηH − ηL) , (A.7)
where we have used the fact that 2µ¯ = µL + µH , 2η¯ ≡ ηL + ηH , and define the
parameter:
ξ ≡ 4α
(µH − µL)(ηH − ηL) . (A.8)
The distribution function (A.6) can thus be written as:
H(µ, η) =
(µ− µL)(η − ηL)





(µH − µ)(ηH − η)
]
. (A.9)
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Second, we compute some locational parameters for the bivariate uniform distri-
bution. The unconditional means are stated in (A.3). For the unconditional variances
we find:
σ2µ ≡ var (µ) ≡ E [µ− µ¯]2 =
∫ µH
µL




σ2η ≡ var (η) ≡ E [η − η¯]2 =
∫ ηH
ηL




The following lemma is useful.




ηh (η, µ) dη∫ ηH
ηL
h (η, µ) dη




µh (η, µ) dµ∫ µH
µL
h (η, µ) dµ
= µ¯+ ξσ2µ(η − η¯).





























Note that for χ = η or χ = µ we can write:
χ2H − χ2L = (χH − χL) (χH + χL) = 2χ¯ (χH − χL) ,
χ3H − χ3L = (χH − χL)
(















Using these results for χ = η, the term in square brackets on the right-hand side of
50 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
(A.12) can be simplified to:







= (ηH − ηL)
[






= (ηH − ηL)
[
η¯ +
ξ(µ− µ¯) [η¯2 − ηLηH]
3
]
= (ηH − ηL)
[
η¯ +




By using (A.14) and noting the definition of σ2η in (A.12) we obtain the result to be
proved. The derivation for Γ2 proceeds along similar lines. ■









η¯ + ξσ2η(µ− µ¯)
















= µ¯η¯ + ξσ2η
µ¯2 − µHµL
3
= µ¯η¯ + ξσ2µσ
2
η, (A.15)
where we have used the results from (A.13) for χ = µ. Hence, the covariance between
η and µ is given by:
cov (µ, η) ≡ E (µη)− µ¯η¯ = ξσ2µσ2η, (A.16)
and the correlation coefficient between η and µ is:
cor (µ, η) ≡ cov (µ, η)√
var (µ) var (η)
= ξσµση. (A.17)
If ξ = 0 then µ and η are uncorrelated.
2.B Appendix B
In the presence of binding borrowing constraints, µL < µbct < µH , we define the
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In this appendix we prove that µ¯pt > µ¯ant > µ¯ and AS t > 1. The proof of µ¯ant > µ¯
is obvious. To show that µ¯pt > µ¯ant is less trivial. The proof for this result proceeds
along the lines of Heijdra and Reijnders (2012, fn. 7). Individual annuity demand
can be written in a separable form as:
Apt (µ, η) ≡ Apt (µ)η,
with:











Since ∂Φ(·)/∂µ < 0 it follows readily that ∂Apt (µ)/∂µ > 0. The expression for the








where Zt(µ) is defined as follows:
Zt(µ) ≡ Apt (µ)Γ1(µ).
Note that Zt(µ) is increasing in µ (because both Apt (µ) and Γ1(µ) are) so that



















Zt(µ)− Z¯t + Z¯t
]













where the inequality follows from the fact that cov(Zt(µ), µ) > 0. Hence we have
established that µ¯pt > µ¯ant > µ¯ and thus AS t > 1. ■
2.C Appendix C
In this appendix we briefly discuss the micro- and macroeconomic effects of public
pensions under perfect information. This was also the subject matter of Abel (1987).
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In our discussion we focus the attention on pension system A. We conclude this
appendix with a brief evaluation of the quantitative results for systems B and C.
Under pension system A the income endowment points are given by:
(1− θ)ηwt, ληwt+1 + θζA 1 + rt+1
µ¯
ηwt. (C.1)
For given factor prices the endowments are linear in η. In terms of Figure C.1, the
income endowment line IEL is a ray from the origin and individuals are distributed
on the line segment ELEH . Note that IEL is a counter-clockwise rotation of the
income endowment line without pensions (the dashed line in the figure). The budget
constraints of an individual with characteristics µ and η are given by:
Cyt (µ, η) +A
p
t (µ, η) = (1− θ)ηwt, (C.2)
Cot+1(µ, η) = ληwt+1 +
1 + rt+1
µ




where we have used the expression for the full-information annuity rate of interest
from (2.4). Under full information there is no sign restriction on annuity demand.
Indeed, if an individual chooses Apt (µ, η) < 0 then he/she purchases a life-insured
loan (at the actuarially fair borrowing rate). As a result the lifetime budget constraint
of the individual is:


















⪌ 0 for µ ⪋ µ¯
ζA
. (C.5)
Note that θnt gets larger the unhealthier is the individual so that—in stark contrast
to the asymmetric information case—the unhealthiest individuals actually face a
positive contribution rate. The public pension system provides such individuals
with a highly disadvantageous social annuity rate based on the average survival rate
in the population (rather than their own). Under full information, pension system
A thus redistributes resources from unhealthy to healthy individuals.
Optimal consumption (during youth and old age) and private annuity demand
are given by:
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In Figure C.1 the choices of the four corner types are illustrated. For a pension
system of realistic size, IEL lies to the right of MRSC and all individuals purchase
private annuities, i.e. the nation’s capital stock is not fully owned by the public
pension system. For the lowest-ability individuals consumption occurs at points A
(for µL) and B (for µH). For the highest-ability agents the consumption points are
at C (for µL) and D (for µH). Hence, the introduction of a pension system A of
realistic size does not cause the market for life-insured loans to become active. (For
a large pension system, all agents buy life-insured loans and the national capital
stock is owned by the public pension system.)












Apt (µ, η)h(µ, η)dµdη
]
. (C.9)


























where factor prices follow from (2.20)–(2.21).
In column (b) of Table C.1 we report some key features of the steady-state
equilibrium under pension system A. Comparing columns (b) and (a) we find that
output per efficiency unit of labour and the wage rate both increase slightly (by
0.28%) whilst the steady-state capital intensity is increased somewhat (by 1.04%).
As a result of the increase in the capital intensity, the annual interest rate falls
by 2 basis points (rˆa = 4.98%). Finally, as the welfare indicators at the bottom of
Table C.1 reveal, under pension system A healthy (unhealthy) individuals are better
(worse) off compared to the FI case. The pension system slightly stimulates capital
accumulation but redistributes resources from unhealthy to healthy individuals.
In columns (c) and (d) of Table C.1 we also report the quantitative results for,
respectively, pension systems B and C. The analytical expressions characterizing
these equilibria are obtained by replacing ζA in (C.1)–(C.9) by, respectively, ζB(η)
and ζC(η) given in (2.67) and (2.81) above. The expression for kt+1 is slightly more





























for i ∈ {B,C}. Despite the fact that systems B and C incorporate some (implicit
or explicit) redistribution from healthy to unhealthy individuals, the unhealthy con-
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tinue to be worse off under both systems when compared to the FI case without
pensions.
























Legend LBC(µi, ηj) is the lifetime budget constraint for an individual with sur-
vival probability µi and productivity level ηj . The thin lines represent the FI case
without pensions. IEL is the income endowment line and agents are located on the
line segment ELEH . MRSC is the consumption Euler equation under perfect infor-
mation with actuarially fair annuities at the individual level. Optimal consumption
for individual (µi, ηj) is located at the intersection of MRSC and LBC(µi, ηj). Pro-
vided the pension system is of a realistic size, IEL lies to the right of MRSC and all
individuals purchase private annuities.
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Table C.1: Pensions under full information
(a) FI (b) SAA (c) SAB (d) SAC
θ = 0.025 θ = 0.025 θ = 0.025 θ = 0.025
yˆ 10.000 10.028 10.027 10.025
kˆ 0.395 0.400 0.399 0.399
%Q1 12.34 9.25 8.47 7.55
%Q2 19.81 14.84 14.37 14.07
%Q3 28.73 21.53 21.68 21.99
%Q4 39.12 29.31 30.41 31.31
%SAS 25.06 25.08 25.09
rˆ 6.04 5.99 5.99 5.99
rˆa 5.00% 4.98% 4.98% 4.98%
wˆ 7.250 7.271 7.269 7.268
B̂C 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
cˆy 5.357 5.368 5.367 5.367
%Q1 15.99 15.90 15.98 16.07
%Q2 22.10 22.05 22.10 22.13
%Q3 28.06 28.07 28.06 28.02
%Q4 33.85 33.98 33.86 33.76
cˆo 4.087 4.099 4.099 4.098
%Q1 12.23 12.17 12.26 12.37
%Q2 19.74 19.70 19.77 19.81
%Q3 28.75 28.76 28.75 28.72
%Q4 39.28 39.37 39.22 39.10
EΛˆ(µL, ηL) 1.014 1.002 1.003 1.004
EΛˆ(µH , ηL) 1.433 1.450 1.463 1.484
EΛˆ(µL, ηH) 1.529 1.522 1.521 1.521
EΛˆ(µH , ηH) 2.143 2.153 2.149 2.146
Note Here %Qj denotes the share accounted for by skill quartile j (averaged over
all survival rates) of the variable directly above it. %SAS is the share owned by the
social annuity system. EΛˆ(µi, ηj) gives expected utility for an agent with health type
µi and skill type ηi.




*This chapter is based on Heijdra, Jiang and Mierau (2017a).
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3.1 Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Yaari (1965) showed that, in the absence of bequest mo-
tives, individuals facing life-time uncertainty should fully annuitize all their assets.
Allowing for bequest motives, Davidoff et al. (2005) show that individuals should
annuitize the part of their savings that they wish to consume in old age, whilst leav-
ing the remainder in a non-annuitized savings account. However, in spite of their
strong theoretical benefits, in practice annuity uptake is much lower – with individ-
uals opting to hold the lion’s share of their assets in non-annuitized accounts (see,
for instance, Inkmann et al. (2011)).
The seeming discrepancy between the theoretical predictions by Yaari (1965)
and Davidoff et al. (2005) and the empirical findings of, for instance, Inkmann et
al. (2011) is commonly dubbed as the annuity puzzle and explanations for it have
been sought both in the rational and the behavioral domain (see, Brown (2007) for
a review).1 As regards the behavioral domain, explanations for the puzzle have been
sought in concerns about financial literacy and its associated cognitive constraints
(Brown et al., 2015). Within the rational domain the focus has been predominantly
on market imperfections such as asymmetric information and adverse selection. In-
tuitively, such imperfections arise from the fact that in order for the annuity pre-
mium to be actuarial fair, it needs to be priced according to the survival probability
of the individual. Such information is, however, generally unverifiable leading to
asymmetric information between annuity firms and their (potential) customers with
mis-priced annuities as a consequence. Mitchell et al. (1999), for instance, show that
asymmetric information and adverse selection lead annuities to be priced substan-
tially lower than in frictionless markets.
With the above in mind, Davidoff et al. (2005) use a two-period life-cycle model
to show that as long as the annuity premium is higher than the return on non-
annuitized savings accounts, individuals should annuitize all assets that they wish
to consume in old age – regardless of whether the annuity premium has been driven
down due to asymmetric information and adverse selection. Therefore, asymmetric
information alone cannot be used as an explanation of the annuity puzzle. Hence, in
this paper we combine two commonly considered explanations of the annuity puzzle
– bequest motives and asymmetric information – to assess how their interplay can
rationalize (some of) the annuity puzzle.
The starting point of our analysis is the celebrated paper by Abel (1986) in which
he considers a two-period life-cycle model in which individuals differ according to
their survival probabilities and shows that private annuities cannot perfectly sub-
stitute for a mandatory fully-funded social security system due to adverse selection
caused by asymmetric information concerning individual mortality. Importantly, our
analysis differs from his in the sense that he limits his analysis to individuals with
1In the current context we interpret the annuity puzzle as meaning that in reality individuals
hold their assets mainly in non-annuitized savings, whilst existing theory would predict that at
least a substantial share of their savings are annuitized.
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a strictly positive demand for annuities. In contrast, we impose a borrowing con-
straints, which implies that individuals can hold a non-negative amount of annuities.
This generalization of Abel’s framework enables us to consider how the annuity puz-
zle may arise through combination of asymmetric information and bequest motives.
The main finding of this Chapter is that while bequest motives and asymmetric
information in isolation cannot account for the annuity puzzle, their interplay can.
Indeed, we find that the combination of asymmetric information and bequest motives
will cause low-health (that is, high-mortality) individuals to refrain from annuitizing
their assets. Intuitively, this result arises because bequest motives enhance the value
of non-annuitized savings so that in order for individuals to choose annuities over
non-annuitized savings they require annuities to be priced nearly actuarially fair.
This is, however, not possible due to the pooling of health types as a consequence
of asymmetric information.
To separate the impact of asymmetric information from that of adverse selection
we derive our result in two steps. First, we consider the impact of having a publicly
sponsored annuity plan in which the government offers an annuity premium based
on the average mortality rate in the society. Here we show that for such a rate low-
health individuals will already refrain from annuitizing their assets for the reasons
outlined above. In the second step, we consider a private annuity market in which
profit maximizing firms take into account that in order not to suffer losses due to
low-health types dropping out of the annuity market, the market annuity rate has to
be lower than the one based on the average mortality rate. Needless to say, this lower
rate leads ever healthier individuals to retreat from the annuity market. Importantly,
this decomposition of our main result implies that non-annuitization by low-health
individuals cannot be solved by a government policy aimed at eliminating the adverse
selection component of annuity prices.2
Through two extensions of our model we consider the interplay between bequest
and asymmetric information for non-annuitization further. First of all, we consider
the role of a pay-as-you-go social security system – a common program for financing
retirement consumption. Here we show that such a system leads to crowding out
of savings; as is to be expected. In addition, however, in the context of a private
annuity market it also leads ever healthier individuals to retreat from the annuity
market. Because social security is non-bequeathable we also observe that healthy
individuals reduce the share of annuities in their retirement savings portfolio sub-
stantially. Second, taking cue from the literature on the health-wealth nexus (see,
Currie (2009)), we introduce a correlation between health and earning ability of in-
dividuals. Here we show that such correlations will aggravate adverse selection on
the annuity market as the higher wealth holdings of healthier individuals will push
down the annuity premium more than if such correlations are absent.
This Chapter extends and adds to the extensive literature aimed at understand-
ing the role of annuities for the provision of retirement income. Within this vast
2Elsewhere we consider whether the government should stimulate use of annuity markets in the
first place, see Heijdra et al. (2014, 2016).
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literature our particular focus is on the role of the interplay between bequests and
asymmetric information. The cross-section between these items was pioneered by
Abel (1986) and recently revived by Lockwood (2012) who combines bequest mo-
tives with the omnibus imperfection factor of Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2008) and
Heijdra and Mierau (2012) to show that generic annuity market imperfections in
combination with bequest motives can give rise to the low observed levels of annu-
itization suggested by the analysis of, for instance, Inkmann et al. (2011). While fol-
lowing Mitchell et al. (1999), Lockwood attributes his imperfection factor to sources
such as asymmetric information, he does not model the underlying heterogeneity be-
tween individuals as such. Hence, we open up the black box of Lockwood’s generic
imperfection factor by highlighting how it may arise and how its impact differs across
health types.
The remainder of this Chapter is set up as follows. The next section outlines the
analytical framework. Section 3.3 details the interplay between bequest motives and
asymmetric information. The subsequent section contains extensions to a pay-as-you-
go social security system and the health-wealth nexus. The final section concludes.
3.2 Analytical Framework
The basic set up of our model is similar to Abel (1986). Individuals live for two
periods – youth and old age – and face uncertain survival from the first period to the
next. While each individual knows his/her own survival probability, µ, with certainty
it is not verifiable to outsiders. Individuals differ from each other in their survival
probabilities and we assume that health types are continuously distributed from
those with lowest survival probability, µL, to those with the highest probability of
survival, µH according to some distribution function with probability density h(µ).3
During youth individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor and during old-age
(s)he is retired. As a consequence (s)he earns a wage, w, in the first period, which is
split between consumption, CY , non-annuitized savings, S, and annuities, A. Hence,
the first period budget constraint equals:
CY + S +A = w. (3.2.1)
Individuals have their offspring at the beginning of the second period, after which
life-time uncertainty is resolved. If the individual dies, all non-annuitized savings,
including any returns, flow to the offspring in the form of unintended bequests, BU :
BU = (1 + r)S, (3.2.2)
where r is the interest rate on savings. By contrast, surviving individuals split their
wealth between consumption, CO, and intentional bequests, BI :
CO +BI = (1 + r)S + (1 + rA(µ))A, (3.2.3)
3Observe that by using Abel (1986) as a starting point our model generalizes that of Lockwood
(2012) who abstracts from heterogeneity in individual health types and the consequent impact of
asymmetric information and adverse selection.
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where rA is the return on annuities, which depends on the survival probability
and may or may not be actuarially fair (see below). Combining (3.2.1)-(3.2.3) and
imposing a borrowing constraint (i.e., A ≥ 0 & S ≥ 0) provides the consolidated
life-time intertemporal budget constraint:4




Individuals derive utility from own consumption as well as from the bequest left
to their offspring. Hence, the expected life-time utility function of an individual is
given by:
EΛ = U(CY ) +
1− µ
1 + ρ




U(CO) + V (BI)
)
, (3.2.5)
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference and U(C) and V (B) are increasing and
concave utility functions of own consumption and bequests, respectively. Regarding
the utility function we follow much of the literature and use an iso-elastic function




1−1/σ if σ > 0, σ ̸= 1,
lnC if σ = 1.
(3.2.6)
In symmetry with the utility function, we assume that the bequest function also





1−1/σ if σ > 0, σ ̸= 1,
η ln(θ +B) if σ = 1,
(3.2.7)
where we follow the extant literature and let the σ be equal across the different
sources of utility. The remaining structure is as follows: η ≥ 0 describes the strength
of the bequest motive and θ ≥ 0 determines the threshold wealth below which
individuals do not leave bequests to their offspring. The structure in (3.2.7) can
accommodate the most commonly used functional forms in the literature.5 Lockwood
(2012), for instance, assumes θ > 0, which makes bequests luxury goods. Abel (1986),
by contrast, lets θ = 0 implying that each individual, regardless of his/her asset
position, leaves the same proportion of wealth as bequests, which is at odds with
empirical evidence (see, De Nardi et al. (2010) and Lockwood (2012)).
The objective of the individual is to maximize (3.2.5) subject to (3.2.4) and non-
negativity constraints on bequests, savings and annuities leading to the following
4For sake of internal consistency, individuals who leave bequests should also receive bequests.
Abel (1986) handles this by endowing each individual with some level of initial wealth. However, this
only affects the implications of the model if a general equilibrium perspective is taken, which we do
not pursue. In a partial equilibrium setting it becomes an exogenous constant of the maximization
problem with no impact on the optimality conditions.
5See, Lockwood (2012) and Pashchenko (2013) for overviews.
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first order conditions:
U ′(CY )− (1 + rA(µ)) µ
1 + ρ
U ′(CO) = 0, (3.2.8a)
U ′(CO)− V ′(BI) = 0, (3.2.8b)





′(BI) = 0, (3.2.8c)
where we have assumed an interior solution (i.e., BI , A, S > 0) and (3.2.8a) is the
consumption Euler equation, (3.2.8b) governs the trade-off between consumption in
old age and the bequests that are left for the offspring and (3.2.8c) describes the
trade-off between unintended and intended bequests.
The condition in (3.2.8c) immediately reveals that the trade-off between unin-
tended and intended bequests – and, thereby, between bequests and old age con-
sumption – depends critically on the difference between the interest rate on annuities
and the rate on savings. To set ideas assume that annuities are priced at an actuar-
ially fair rate. In that case:




implying that purchasing annuities exactly offsets the life-time uncertainty faced by
individuals. Substituting (3.2.9) into (3.2.8c) implies that V ′(BU ) = V ′(BI), which
by virtue of the assumptions surrounding (3.2.7) implies BU = BI . Combining the
latter with (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) provides CO = (1 + rA(µ))A, which is the result of
Abel (1986) and Davidoff et al. (2005) outlined in the introduction. That is, with
actuarially fair annuities individuals annuitize the part of their assets that they wish
to use consumption in old age. In that sense, bequest motives by themselves cannot
explain the annuity puzzle as they still imply substantial degrees of annuitization.
If we abstract from bequest motives, only condition (3.2.8a) remains relevant for
the individual optimization problem. In that case the trade-off induced by bequests
between non-annutized savings and annuities disappears and individuals chose the
financial asset with the highest return. This implies that unless annuities are priced
extremely unfair (the annuity premium would have to be negative), individuals will
always annuitize all their savings as the return that they receive on them is higher
than the return on uninsured assets (see, Davidoff et al. (2005)). This leads to a
counter-factual prediction indicating that mis-priced annuities in isolation can also
not rationalize the observed low levels of annuitization.
In sum, in addition to outlining our analytical framework, in this section we have
briefly analyzed two commonly considered reasons for non-annuitization – bequests
and unfair pricing. For both cases we show that standard model cannot explain low
levels of annuitization. This does not, however, mean that bequest motives and mis-
pricing are irrelevant for the annuity puzzle. In fact, as we outline in the remainder
of the paper, while individually they cannot rationalize puzzle, jointly they can.
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3.3 Bequest Motives & Asymmetric Information
To analyze the role of asymmetric information concerning health states and bequest
motives for non-annuitization, we start by focusing on the fact that individuals are
heterogeneous with respect to their health types. With health types being private
information, healthy individuals have an incentive to claim being unhealthy as this
would increase the premium that they receive on their annuities (see Eq. (3.2.9))
3.3.1 Non-Annuitization
Relegating the impact of adverse selection to Section 3.3.2, we assume that the
government sets up an non-mandatory annuity plan that offers a single – pooling –
contract to all potential participants:




where µ¯ is the average mortality rate. With (3.3.1) in hand, the individual budget
constraint becomes:




where we have included µ as an argument to choice variables to highlight their
dependence on individual mortality.
As before, the objective of the individual is to maximize (3.2.5) subject to (3.3.2)
and a set of borrowing constraints on bequests, annuities and savings. Consequently,
assuming an interior solution for bequests and savings, the first order conditions
become:
U ′(CY (µ))− (1 + rA(µ¯)) µ
1 + ρ
U ′(CO(µ)) = 0, (3.3.3a)
U ′(CO(µ))− V ′(BI(µ)) = 0, (3.3.3b)





′(BI(µ)) = 0, (= 0 if A(µ) > 0),(3.3.3c)
where in the final line we take into account that depending on whether the non-
negativity constraint on annuity holdings is binding or not, the first order condition
differs slightly. Crucially, the possibility that individuals can rationally choose not
to hold annuities whilst having positive savings is what sets our analysis apart from
that of Abel (1986). Indeed, while he limits his analysis to individuals with positive
annuity holdings, we let individuals decide how many, if any, annuities to hold.
To consider the possibility of non-annuitization further it serves to impose the
functional forms laid out in (3.2.6) and (3.2.7). With those in hand, individual de-
mand for annuities is given by:
A(µ) =
[
















64 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk




















From (3.3.4) we can observe that annuity demand will be zero if:







ησ = 0, (3.3.6)
where µ¯C is the cut-off health type. That is, individuals with a survival probability
that is equal to or smaller than µ¯C will not purchase any annuities even though they
hold positive savings. Intuitively, for these individuals the gain from annuitization
(i.e., a higher premium) does not outweigh the costs of annuitization (i.e., the welfare
loss of not leaving a bequest) because the premium that they can get is insufficient.
Hence, the combination of bequest motives and under-priced annuities can justify
why individuals do not hold annuities. Importantly, the fact that annuity holdings
are lower for individuals with worse health is in line with empirical evidence provided
by, for instance, Inkmann et al. (2007), who show that individuals holding annuities
have a higher subjective survival probability (our µ) than those who do not.
3.3.2 Adverse Selection
To generate a better understanding of how non-annuitization by low-health types
affects the annuity premium we now move from a government sponsored to a private
annuity market. The main discrepancy between these two options is that in the latter
case annuity firms take into account that offering the rate that the government offers
would lead them to make losses. Therefore, the rate they offer will be based on the
asset weighted average mortality rate:











is the asset weighted average survival probability and µC is the cut-off value of
health types not wanting to annuitize when the impact of adverse selection on the
annuity premium is taken into account. Repeating the steps leading up to (3.3.4),
the non-annuitization condition of (3.3.6) now becomes:







ησ = 0. (3.3.8)
So that the solution to µC can now be determined by solving (3.3.7) and (3.3.8)
jointly. For the current purpose we are not, however, interested in the exact value
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of µC but in its relative value with respect to µ¯C – as described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Adverse selection increases the cut-off health type. That is,
µC > µ¯C .
Proof. Equations (3.3.6) and (3.3.8) reveal that µC > µ¯C if and only if rAS < r¯.
From (3.3.1) and (3.3.7) this condition will be met if µA > µ¯, which is known to be
true from Abel (1986). □
Hence, while pooling in combination with bequest motives can account for a share
of non-annuitization observed in financial markets, adverse selection aggravates non-
annuitization further in the sense that ever healthier individuals rationally choose
to forgo annuitizing their assets.
3.3.3 Numerical Example
To give more sense to the theoretical arguments outlined above we use this section to
provide a brief numerical example of our model. To this end, let the interest rate and
rate of time preferences both be 3%. Assuming that both periods last 40 years this
implies r = ρ = 2.26. We obtain a consistent wage rate by imposing a Cobb-Douglas
production function with unit total factor productivity which, assuming a capital
share of output equal to 0.3, leads to w = 13.18. As concerns the utility function
parameters we let the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution equal σ = 1, we
assume that individuals derive less utility from bequests than from own consumption
by setting η = 0.5 and we let the bequest threshold equal 20% of first period income.
Finally, we assume that health types are distributed uniformly between survival
probabilities µL = 0.1 and µH = 0.9.6
Using the various parameter values outlined above provides µ¯C = 0.25 and
µC = 0.54. This implies that of all individuals who drop out of the annuity mar-
ket about half drops out purely due to the existence of a pooling equilibrium as
represented by a government sponsored annuity market, while the other half drops
out due to the adverse selection induced by asymmetric information in, for instance,
a privatized annuity market. Importantly, this emphasizes the point previewed in
the introduction that the impact of asymmetric information on annuitization is a
two-step process. First, a part of the population ceases to annuitize purely due to
the existence of the pooling equilibrium caused by the government mandated an-
nuity rate. Second, a further part quits the annuity market because of the adverse
selection induced by the first stage makes the annuity premium ever more unfair for
low health types.
Figure 4.1 visualizes the arguments outlined in this section. In particular it shows
how the cut-off value for health types who still annuitize is affected by the pooling
equilibrium and by adverse selection. Indeed, while in the absence of both all health
6Our results are robust to various other parameter constellation, available upon request.
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Figure 3.1: Retreat from Annuity Market due to Pooling and Adverse Selection
PE AS0.1 0.90.25 0.54
µL µ¯C µC µH
Note. PE stands for Pooling Equilibrium. AS stands for adverse selection.
types annuitize that part of their savings that they wish to consume in old-age,
the pooling equilibrium eliminates the most unhealthy types from the market. This
effect is then further aggravated through adverse selection which causes ever healthier
individuals to retreat from the annuity market.
3.4 Further Analysis
Having established how the combination of bequest motives and asymmetric infor-
mation may lead to rational non-annuitization, we use this section to explore the
implications of pay-as-you-go social security and the health-wealth nexus. Earlier
analyses have suggested that social security might be a reason for why annuity hold-
ings among individuals is limited and we use this section to assess how it affects the
cut-off health value below which individuals do not annuitize savings. Similarly, we
assess how the cut-off value is affected by a correlation between earnings and health.
3.4.1 Social Security
A common rationalization for low observed levels of annuitization is that individuals
have covered their longevity risk through pre-existing mandatory public pension
arrangements such as social security. However, while social security may crowd out
savings in general, there is no reason why its existence would lead individuals to not
annuitize their private savings in the absence of additional market imperfections. In
this subsection we develop this point further by considering the impact of a pay-as-
you-go social security system on our above results.
The social security system is financed by imposing a tax on the young, which is
redistributed to the currently old in the form of a pension payment. Formally, the
system implies that, when young, individuals pay a tax T and in return, conditional
on survival, the pension payment equals (1 + rS)T , where rS is the internal rate of
return of the social security system. Letting T be constant we can determine rS by





(1 + rS)Tµh(µ)dµ, (3.4.1)
where the left-hand-side is the income of the social security system while the right-
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hand-side are its expenditures. Solving (3.4.1) for rS provides:




which may be higher or lower than the rate received in the adverse selection equi-
librium rA(µA), derived above.7
Taking into account the social security system, the life-time budget constraint
now becomes:
C2(µ) +B
I(µ) = (1 + rA(µA))(w − C1(µ))− r
A(µA)− r
1 + r
BA(µ) + (rS − rA(µA))T.
(3.4.3)
Comparing the budget constraint in (3.4.3) to the previous one in (3.3.2), the aug-
mented term on the right-hand-side reflects the increased (decreased) life-time re-
sources due to higher (lower) return from the social security system.
Repeating the steps outlined in the sections above, the optimal amount of annuity
purchases is as follows:
A(µ) =
[






















Defining µSSC as the cut-off health value for which individuals no longer annuitize
(i.e., A(µSSC ) = 0), we observe that as long as T > 0, µC must satisfy:







ησ > 0. (3.4.5)
Comparing (3.3.8) to (3.4.5) immediately reveals that for given rA(µA), the cut-
off health value µSSC increases after the introduction of the social security system.
Naturally, as µSSC increases, rA(µA) decreases which causes ever more individuals
to abandon the annuity market. Intuitively, this occurs because the social security
system crowds out savings by low-health types so that they drop out of the financial
market altogether, thereby also aggravating adverse selection in the annuity market.
In Figure (3.2) we visualize the above effect once more by alluding to the nu-
merical example introduced above. For sake of argument we let the social security
contribution be a 20% of the wage rate implying that T = 0.2w which provides a
social security return of rS = 1, implying a benefit rate of 0.4. As the figure high-
lights, the social security system further aggravates adverse selection in the annuity
market. Indeed, upon the imposition of the system, only very healthy individuals
remain in the annuity market. In particular, only those with a survival probability
of more than 86%.
7Alternatively, and equivalently, we can define the social security system in terms of a tax rate
τSS and a benefit rate βSS , which are both proportional to the wage rate. Condition (3.4.3) then
becomes the familiar expression: τSS/βSS = 1/µ¯.
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Figure 3.2: Non-annuitization and Social Security
SS 0.860.1 0.90.25 0.54
µL µ¯C µC µSSC µH
Note. SS stands for Pay-As-You-Go Social Security.
This is not, however, the complete picture as even the very healthy types
adjust their savings behavior due to the presence of the social security system.
In particular, they reduce their total savings and, more importantly, they reduce
the share of savings held in the form of annuities significantly. This result arises
because social security is non-bequeathable so that in the presence of bequest
motives, social security leads to a relatively stronger crowding out of annuities
than of non-annuitized savings. We visualize this portfolio re-balancing in Table
3.1. As can be seen in the table, for the most healthy individuals, total savings
(A + S) decline but the total amount of non-annuitized savings actually increases.
Hence, the crowding out of savings through the social security system is captured
by savings held in annuitzed accounts. We formalize this intuition in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. A pay-as-you-go social security system leads to a re-balancing of
retirement portfolios toward non-annuitized assets.
Proof. In the presence of social security the ratio of annuities to non-annuitized
























To show that an increase in the size of the social security system reduces this ratio
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consider that the sign of d
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SSS(µ)
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Hence, an increase in the size of the social security system decreases the relative
amount of assets held in the form of annuities.
□
Table 3.1: Numerical Example
AS SS
µC µ¯
AS µH µC µ¯
SS µH
CY 0.2302 0.2209 0.2124 0.2064 0.2056 0.2048
CO 0.1594 0.2043 0.2458 0.2010 0.2043 0.2075
BA 0.2096 0.1101 0.0183 0.0953 0.0787 0.0622
BI 0.0502 0.0727 0.0934 0.0710 0.0727 0.0743
A 0.0000 0.0398 0.0765 0.0000 0.0059 0.0117
S 0.0643 0.0338 0.0056 0.0292 0.0241 0.0191
Note: Benchmark case. T = 0.2w. µ¯ = (µC + µH)/2.
3.4.2 Health-Wealth Nexus
Whilst the preceding analysis has taken into account heterogeneity between indi-
viduals in terms of their survival probabilities, we use this subsection to extend
the degree of heterogeneity to a correlation between earnings ability and health. To
this end, we take inspiration from, amongst others, Currie (2007), who convincingly
shows that health and wealth are correlated due to – at least partially – a positive
relationship between health and earnings ability. We implement this relationship
in our model by letting an individual with better health have a higher first period
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1 + rA(µHW )
) (
w(µ)− CY (µ))− rA(µHW )− r
1 + r
BA(µ), (3.4.6)
where rA(µHW ) is the rate on annuities when we take into account the correlation

































Viewing (3.4.8) immediately implies that the cut-off value for health types is implic-
itly determined by:







ησ = 0, (3.4.9)
in combination with (3.4.7). This brings us to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The health-wealth nexus aggravates adverse selection in the annuity
market:
Proof. Since w′(µ) > 0, AHW (µ) − A(µ) is positively related to µ. First we show
that rA(µHW ) < rA(µA), which is equivalent in showing that µHW > µA. Using the
definitions of µA and µHW from (3.3.7) and (3.4.7), respectively, we can write:















so that: rA(µHW ) < rA(µA). By comparing (3.3.8) to (3.4.9) this automatically
implies µHWC > µC . □
In words, accounting for the health-wealth nexus aggravates adverse selection
in the private annuity market. Intuitively, this result arises from the fact that the
health-wealth nexus increases the amount of annuities held by healthy individuals
so that the annuity premium drops, leading more lower health types to abandon the
annuity market.
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3.4.3 An Afterthough on Administration Costs
We now close the analysis by analyzing the impact of a mark-up due to, for instance,
administration costs but also monopoly profits or marketing costs on the extent of
adverse selection in the annuity market. These mark-ups were initially popularized
by Mitchell et al. (1999) to calculate the money’s worth of annuities who attribute
them to administration costs as well as adverse selection.8 We have, however, already
addressed adverse selection above.
To this end let the return on annuities equal:
1 + rA(λ, µ) = (1− λ)(1 + rA(µA)), (3.4.12)
where λ is a so-called load factor, which measures the percentage reduction in the
annuity premium due to administration costs. The higher λ, the higher the admin-











rS − rA(λ, µ))T.
(3.4.13)
Without testing the patience of the reader, we can use the new budget constraint
in (3.4.12) to derive the new annuity demand. Doing so and setting the ensuing value
of A(µACC ) = 0 provides the new cut-off value of health type who do not annuitize,
µACC . By observing (3.4.12) we immediately note that µACC > µC so that the adminis-
tration costs aggravate adverse selection in the annuity market. By similar reasoning
as above we see that this follows from the fact that administration costs make annu-
ities unattractive in general and in particular for the unhealthier types. Moreover,
once the administration costs induce low health types to retreat from the annuity
market, the annuity premium drops further hence inducing ever more individuals
to abandon the annuity market. Importantly, this provides a distinction between
our analysis and that of Lockwood (2012) and the early analysis of Mitchell et al.
(1999) in the sense that our current result shows the various components generally
attributed to the annuity load factor amplify each other.9
3.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter we analyzed the interplay between asymmetric information con-
cerning individual health and bequest motives for the decision of individuals to
annuitize their retirement savings. While asymmetric information and bequest mo-
tives in isolation cannot account for why individuals do not annuitize, we show that
their interplay can. In particular, because bequest motives give additional value to
8Such mark-ups are a common feature in the analysis of annuities (see, for instance, Bütler
(2001), Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2008), Heijdra and Mierau (2012) and Lockwood (2012)).
9It goes without saying that for sufficiently large administration costs even the highest health
types would not annuitize anymore. Similarly, a sufficiently large social security system would also
entice the healthiest types to leave the annuity market.
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non-annuitized savings, under-priced annuities due to asymmetric information are
very unattractive for low health individuals. Analyzing our result further we show
that the presence of a social security system further aggravates adverse selection
and, in addition, leads healthier individuals to re-balance their retirement savings
portfolio away from annuities. The latter being a consequence of the fact that both
annuities and social security are non-bequeathable. Finally, taking into account that
health and wealth are potentially correlated we show that higher wealth holdings
by healthier individuals drive ever more unhealthy individuals out of the annuity
market.
Chapter 4
Annuities and Bequests in
General Equilibrium∗
*This chapter is based on Heijdra, Jiang and Mierau (2017b).
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4.1 Introduction
Bequests motives are often invoked to justify the discrepancy between the theoretical
benefits of annuities displayed in Yaari (1965) and their low uptake as highlighted by,
amongst many others, Inkmann et al. (2011). Indeed, Lockwood (2014) shows that
the presence of bequest motives significantly decreases the enthusiasm for annuities
because they assign a utility value to assets that in the presence of annuities would
have gone into the pool of annuity assets. The previous Chapter reinforces this point
by showing that if asymmetric information, administration costs or social security are
considered, the demand for annuities may very well vanish. Yet in spite of the above,
in many situations a positive demand for annuities prevails – at least theoretically.
After all, not withstanding bequest motives and the like, actuarially fair annuities
– or at least not too unfair – provide a higher return than otherwise equivalent but
not life-insured assets (Davidoff et al., 2005).
Private welfare gains of annuities need not, however, translate into public virtues.
Substantiating this point, a literature is emerging that juxtaposes the partial and
general equilibrium benefits of annuitization. Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), Fehr
and Habermann (2008), Feigenbaum et al. (2013) and Caliendo et al. (2014) point
toward the observation that private and public benefits of annuities differ due to
the loss of unintended bequests. Christening the ensuing problem as the Tragedy of
Annuitization, Heijdra et al. (2014) show that the welfare effects can best be under-
stood by reference to the Golden Rule. In particular, in the absence of annuities any
unconsumed assets flow from older to younger generations. Considering a dynam-
ically efficient economy, this intergenerational transfer constitutes a reverse social
security system, which drives the economy closer to the Golden Rule steady state.
Introducing annuities cuts off this intergenerational flow of assets and, therefore,
reduces capital accumulation and welfare.
Whilst the extant literature concerning the discrepancy between private and pub-
lic benefits of annuities have centered on unintended bequests, the role of intended
bequests has received only muted attention. However, by attaching a utility value
to bequests – as highlighted in the partial equilibrium literature outline above –
bequests motives can potentially mitigate the general equilibrium welfare loss stem-
ming from the opening of an annuity market. Arguing along these lines, Heijdra et
al. (2017b), for instance, provide an informal discussion of the potential role of in-
tentional bequests for the general equilibrium welfare consequences of annuitization.
Against the above backdrop we use the current Chapter to further elucidate the
general equilibrium consequences of opening up an annuity market in the presence
of intentional bequest motives. To this end, we develop a tractable two-period over-
lapping generations model in which individuals face mortality risk in the transition
from the first period to the next. We operationalize the bequest motive along the
lines of the partial equilibrium models of Abel (1986), Lockwood (2012) and Heijdra
et al. (2017a), who consider bequests as gifts from which individuals derive utility.
In keeping with Abel (1986), we embed the individual life-cycle model in a general
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equilibrium context with perfectly competitive firms. In contrast to Abel, however,
we do not consider the role of social security but focus on the impact of opening up
an annuity market on capital accumulation and individual welfare.
Within our framework we set out by focusing on the role of bequest motives
in general equilibrium. Here we show that stronger bequest motives are associated
with higher capital accumulation because they entail a redistribution of assets from
the older to the younger generation. We then proceed by analyzing the impact of
opening up an annuity market on capital accumulation and welfare. Here we derive
our main result that, while the welfare loss of annuities is more muted in the presence
of bequest motives, the Tragedy of Annuitization also prevails when bequest motives
are accounted for. Indeed, if it is individually optimal to annuitize at least a part
of assets, then opening up an annuity market will decrease the flow of assets from
older to younger generations, thereby decreasing capital accumulation and, hence,
welfare.
The remainder of the paper is set-up as follows. Section 4.2 sets out the model
in the absence of annuities and focuses on the role of bequests motives on capital
accumulation. In Section 4.3 we add annuities to the model and assess the impact
of opening up an annuity market on capital accumulation and welfare. Section 4.4
provides some further analysis and the final section concludes. The Appendix collects
the proofs of our propositions.
4.2 Bequests in General Equilibrium
Our general set-up is derived from Abel (1986) and follows the analysis in Chapter 3
. In contrast to our earlier partial equilibrium analysis we disregard heterogeneity in
survival probabilities but instead embed the individual life-cycle model in a general
equilibrium context. In this way we can focus on the general equilibrium impact of
annuities and bequests in a tractable model.
4.2.1 Individuals
Individuals live for a maximum of two periods - youth and old age. They work full
time in the first period and are retired in the second. Survival from the first to the
second period is governed by a probability µ. If an individual dies at the end of
the first period, his/her heir receives an unintended bequest BU . If an individual
survives to the second period, (s)he divides wealth between old age consumption
and intentional bequests. Following Abel (1986), we assume that survivors will leave
bequests BI at the beginning of the second period. Hence, regardless of whether the
individual lives one or two periods, the intergenerational transfer always takes place
at beginning of the second period.1
To set ideas, we first consider the benchmark case in which individuals have no
access to annuities. Expected life-time utility of an individual born at time t is then
1In that sense, we may also refer to the intentional bequests as inter-vivos transfers.
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given by:












where ρ is the pure rate of time preference and CYt and COt+1 are consumption in
youth and old age, respectively.
U(C) and V (B) are increasing and concave utility functions of consumption
and bequests, respectively. In keeping with the extant literature, we parameterize
both as iso-elastic functions with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to




1−1/σ if σ > 0, σ ̸= 1,
lnC if σ = 1.
(4.2.2)





1−1/σ if σ > 0, σ ̸= 1,
η ln(θ +B) if σ = 1,
(4.2.3)
where we have followed the common practice of letting the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution be equal across consumption and bequests. In addition, η ≥ 0 describes
the strength of the bequest motive and θ ≥ 0 is the threshold wealth below which
individuals do not leave bequests. The structure in (4.2.3) is sufficiently general to
reconcile commonly used functional forms (see, Pashchenko (2013) for a review).
Following Abel (1986), Hong and Rios-Rull (2007), Caliendo et al. (2014) and
others we assume that accidental and intentional bequests of deceased individuals
are collected by the government and distributed to the next generation. The first
period budget constraint can then be written as:
CYt + St = wt + Zt, (4.2.4)
where wt is wage income, St are savings and Zt are the distributed bequests. If
an individual dies, all savings (including their accrued return) are left behind as
unintended bequests implying that:
BUt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St, (4.2.5)
where rt+1 is the interest rate. If an individual survives, (s)he can distribute the
retirement savings between consumption goods and intentional bequests:
COt+1 +B
I
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)St. (4.2.6)







= wt + Zt. (4.2.7)
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The objective of the consumer is to maximize discounted life-time utility provided
in (4.2.1) subject to the consolidated budget constraint provided in (4.2.7) by choice
of CYt , COt+1 and BIt+1. The ensuing consumption, savings and bequest plans are
given by:
CYt = (1− φ(rt+1))
[


































BUt+1 = (1 + rt+1)φ(rt+1)
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The expression in (4.2.8c) allows us to consider the partial equilibrium relation-
ship between bequest motives and individual capital accumulation (i.e., savings).
Starting with the strength of the bequest motive, η, we observe that ∂φ∂η > 0. Intu-
itively, consumers with stronger bequest motives are more inclined to save. There-
fore, a stronger bequest motive decreases youth consumption, CYt , and increases
savings, St as well as unintended and intended bequests, BIt+1 and BUt+1, respec-
tively. Conversely, a stronger threshold wealth, θ, makes the marginal bequest less
attractive and, therefore, decreases savings. Indeed, straightforward differentiation
of (4.2.8c) with respect to θ provides ∂St∂θ < 0. While these are partial equilibrium
results, we use the following section to highlight that individual results concerning
capital accumulation and bequests translate into a positive aggregate relationship
between the strength of the bequest motive and capital accumulation. Similarly, a
higher threshold wealth decrease aggregate capital accumulation.
4.2.2 Aggregate Economy
Demography
Let the size of the young cohort at time t be Lt and the population growth rate be
n then in every new period a cohort of size Lt−1 = (1 + n)Lt is born. Aggregating
over both cohorts implies that the total population in the economy at time t is given
by:
Pt = µLt−1 + Lt =
1 + n+ µ
1 + n
Lt, (4.2.10)
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where we have taken into account that due to lifetime uncertainty only a fraction µ
of the young cohort survive into the next generation.
Production
There is a large number of perfectly competitive firms producing output according





t , 0 < ε < 1, (4.2.11)
where Yt is total output, Ω is total factor productivity, Kt is the aggregate capital
stock and Lt is the size of the young cohort (i.e., the labor force). In intensive form,




where yt ≡ Yt/Lt is output per capita and kt ≡ Kt/Lt is capital intensity. Assuming
perfect competition, factor prices equal:
rt = εΩ0k
ε−1
t − δ (4.2.13a)
wt = (1− ε)Ω0kεt , (4.2.13b)
where δ is the depreciation rate.
Government
As outlined above, following earlier contributions, we assume that the government
collects intended and unintended bequests and redistributes them to the next gen-
eration. Total bequests in any given period equal ((1 − µ)BUt + µBIt )Lt−1, these
are distributed to all young cohort members in the form of a bequest transfer Zt,
implying the following government budget constraint:
LtZt =
[
(1− µ)BUt + µBSt
]







Substituting (4.2.8d) and (4.2.8e) into (4.2.14) allows us to write the transfer as:
Zt =
(1− µ)BUt + µBIt
1 + n




where α ≡ (1 + µ) + µ ησ1+ησ ∈ (0, 1). From the discussion below (4.2.9) we recall
that BUt and BIt increase with the strength of bequest motive and decrease with the
threshold wealth. Hence, from (4.2.15) it is clear that, keeping factor prices fixed,
a stronger bequest motive increases the bequest transfer, while a higher threshold
wealth decreases it. This can be verified by straightforward differentiation of (4.2.15).
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4.2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the capital market must clear, which implies that total savings of the
young cohort equals the total capital stock: Kt+1 = LtSt or, in per worker terms,
kt+1 = St/(1+ n). Using (4.2.8c) provides the fundamental difference equation that


















Proposition 1. There exists a unique, stable and non-trivial steady state at k(t) =
k.
Proof. See Appendix A. ■
Importantly, with the steady-state solution in hand we can reassess the positive
relationship between bequest motives and capital accumulation derived above using
the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Capital intensity increases with the strength of the bequest
motives and decreases with threshold wealth:
∂k
∂η
> 0 and ∂k
∂θ
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix B. □
Intuitively allowing for bequest motives will introduce an asset flow from older
to younger generations. With younger generations using these assets for savings we
observe a surge in savings (as pointed to above) and, consequently, an increase in ag-
gregate capital accumulation. If, however, individuals have a high threshold wealth,
the intergenerational flow of assets will be more muted so that capital accumulation
will be retarded at the individual as well as the aggregate level. While tempting,
we refrain from making statements about the impact of bequest motives on welfare
as they change the structure of the utility function so that a clean comparison of
welfare with and without bequest motives is not feasible.
4.2.4 Numerical Example
To provide more insights to the theoretical arguments developed above, we perform
a numerical simulation of our model in the current section. To this end we associate
numerical values to each of the model parameters. The annual capital depreciation
rate - where we denote annualized rates with a hat - is six percent (δˆ = 0.06),
the annual population growth rate is one percent (nˆ = 0.01), the time preference
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Figure 4.1: Model Equilibrium













Note: The figure traces out the model equilibrium for various
values of the bequest-motive parameters: η = 0.5 and θ = 0.10
are the benchmark values, η′ = 0.7 and θ′ = 0.15.
parameter is three percent (ρ = 0.03), the efficiency parameter of capital is thirty
percent (ε = 0.30) and total factor productivity Ω is set to be 1. The inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution is σ = 0.7. The benchmark strength of the bequest motive is
chosen such that individuals derive half of the utility from leaving bequests compared
to their own consumption, η = 0.5 and we scale θ such that it equals 10 % of labor
income. We assume that consumers live for a maximum of two periods. The length
of each period is set to be 40 years.2 Finally, consumers face a survival probability
of thirty percent at the end of the first period (µ = 0.3).
In Figure 4.1 we trace out the left and right-hand side of (4.2.16). The finely
dashed line in the middle is the benchmark equilibrium and it highlights the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium. The upper line traces out the equilibrium with a
stronger bequest motive and it shows that the capital stock is indeed higher when
bequest motives are stronger. The lower line shows the equilibrium of the model
when the threshold wealth necessary to leave bequest is high, which is associated to
lower capital accumulation for reasons outlined above.
In Table 4.1 we display the various individual and aggregate quantities in equi-
librium for different combinations of θ and η. The table shows the equilibrium values
with annuities (labeled as A) and without annuities (NA); for now we focus on the
former, in the next section we focus on the latter. As already highlighted in Propo-
sition 2 as well as in Figure 4.1, stronger bequest motives are associated with higher
2The value of δ, n and r follow as δ = 1− (1− δˆ)40, n = (1 + nˆ)40 − 1, and r = (1 + rˆ)40 − 1.
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Table 4.1: Steady-State Values of Selected Model Variables (σ = 0.7)
θ = 0.10, η = 0.5 θ = 0.10, η = 0.7 θ = 0.10, η = 1.0 θ = 0.15, η = 0.5
NA A NA A NA A NA A
k 0.0817 0.0730 0.0967 0.0886 0.1166 0.1093 0.0737 0.0653
Y 0.4718 0.4561 0.4961 0.4833 0.5248 0.5148 0.4574 0.4411
Z 0.0745 0.0555 0.0860 0.0695 0.1001 0.0863 0.0673 0.0479
w 0.3302 0.3193 0.3473 0.3383 0.3673 0.3604 0.3202 0.3088
rˆ 0.0150 0.0169 0.0122 0.0137 0.0091 0.0101 0.0168 0.0188
CY 0.2830 0.2660 0.2894 0.2760 0.2939 0.2839 0.2777 0.2594
CO 0.1572 0.1861 0.1509 0.1763 0.1429 0.1645 0.1619 0.1912
BU 0.2210 0.0826 0.2337 0.1035 0.2490 0.1285 0.2135 0.0714
BI 0.0637 0.0826 0.0828 0.1035 0.1061 0.1285 0.0516 0.0714
A
S+A 0.0000 0.6119 0.0000 0.5438 0.0000 0.4727 0.0000 0.6522
Λ -2.7968 -2.8586 -2.9025 -2.9425 -3.0672 -3.0888 -2.8048 -2.8806
Note: NA and A stand for the case without and with annuity market, respectively.
capital accumulation while a higher threshold wealth is associated with lower capital
accumulation. Having established the role of bequests for individual and aggregate
capital accumulation, we proceed in the next section to study the role of opening
up an annuity market on individual welfare in a general equilibrium setting. Impor-
tantly, this allows us to consider the impact of bequest motives on the discrepancy
between individual and aggregate benefits of annuitization.
4.3 Annuities and Bequests in General Equilibrium
Annuities are life-insured financial assets that pay out conditional on the survival
of the annuitant. If, in our case, the individual survives from the first period to the
second, (s)he receives a return on his/her pension savings in excess of the market rate
on uninsured savings. Conversely, if (s)he passes away, any annuitized assets flow to
the annuity firm. From the seminal work of Yaari (1965) we know that in the absence
of bequest motives it is individually optimal to annuitize all assets. In recent work,
Lockwood (2012) and Chapter 3 show that bequest motives reduce the benefits of
savings as they attach utility value to unconsumed assets.3 Nevertheless, both, and
others, show that in the presence of bequest motives it remains individually optimal
to annuitize at least part the assets because it improves welfare. In this section we
consider whether the increase in welfare also holds after taking into account general
equilibrium repercussions of annuitization.
3Heijdra et al. (2017a) also consider the role of imperfect information, social security and ad-
ministrative costs, all of which we abstract from in the current analysis to focus on the relationship
between partial and general equilibrium benefits of annuitization.
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4.3.1 Annuities
In the presence of annuity markets, the contributions from annuitants are pooled
and invested in the capital market and the returns are then redistributed to the
survivors. Hence, assuming that annuity firms break even, we have the following
no-arbitrage condition:
(1 + rt+1)LtAt = (1 + r
A
t+1)µLtAt, (4.3.1)
with rA being the return on annuities and where the left hand side are the total
annuity holdings, A, of the young generation from time t and the right hand side
is the pay out to the old generation in time t + 1 (i.e., the surviving share of the
young generation from the previous period). Obvious rewriting yields that the return
of annuity equals the return on uninsured assets multiplied by a premium that is
proportional to the probability of survival:
1 + rAt+1 =
1 + rt+1
µ
, 0 < µ < 1, (4.3.2)
which immediately yields that annuities are potentially attractive because they offer
a higher rate of return than uninsured savings.
Should individuals annuitize (part of) their wealth, the temporal budget con-
straints become:
CYt + St +At = wt + Zt, (4.3.3a)
COt+1 +B
I
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)St + (1 + r
A
t+1)At. (4.3.3b)
If consumers survive, their second period’s wealth consists of two parts, the savings
in the capital market and the investment in the annuity market:
Qt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St + (1 + r
A
t+1)At, (4.3.4)
where Qt+1 is the total wealth portfolio of an old individual. Obviously, purchasing
annuities crowds out unintended bequests:
BUt+1 = (1 + rt+1)St =Wt+1 − (1 + rAt+1)At. (4.3.5)
In sum, purchasing annuities has the marginal benefit of a higher rate of return on
assets and the marginal cost of lower accidental bequests.
In a companion paper, Chapter 3, we flesh out the relationship between bequests
and individual savings in detail by also focusing on the role of differential mortality,
administration costs and social security. The take-away message from that analysis
is that the low uptake of annuities can be justified by the combination of bequest
motives with various other common market features of the annuity market - such
as asymmetric information about individual mortality and the existence of a social
security system. For the current purpose we infer from our earlier paper that in spite
of various market features, individuals still derive utility from having access to an
Chapter 4 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
annuity market. In what follows we focus in particular on whether the individual
virtue of annuities translates into general equilibrium benefits as well.
With the discounted life-time utility function unchanged, the consumer’s opti-
mization problem remains the same so that we can combine the various elements as

















where a superscript A indicates values pertaining to the case in which consumers












and the bequest transfer becomes:
ZAt = α




with α′ ≡ ησµ+ησ . This structure highlights the similarity between the fundamen-
tal difference equation of the model without annuities. Indeed, we can write the
difference equation generically as:
















0 without annuity market
1 with annuity market ,
with this set-up in mind we may then redefine Zt = Zt(0) and ZAt = Zt(1), similarly
we may define φ(rt+1) = φ(rt+1, 0) and φA(rt+1) = φ(rt+1, 1). Moreover, as before,
the model with annuities exhibits a unique, stable and non-trivial equilibrium at
k = kA.
With this structure in hand we can now turn to the core of our analysis by
focusing on the impact of opening up an annuity market on steady-state capital
accumulation and welfare. To this end, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. In a dynamically efficient economy for σ ∈ (0, 1) steady-
state capital intensity and welfare are lower in the presence of an annuity market.
Proof. See Appendix C. □
Intuitively, the introduction of annuity markets crowds out unintended bequests,
which leads to lower intergenerational transfers from the old to the young genera-
tion. As a consequence capital accumulation and, considering a dynamically efficient
economy, welfare are reduced.
84 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
4.3.2 Numerical Example Revisited
To illustrate the results contained in Proposition 3, we return to our numerical
example. To this end, we now use Table 4.1 to compare equilibrium outcomes with
and without annuities. There we see that unintended bequests are lower in the
presence of annuities. With the sequence of motions that this sets off we see in the
final row that welfare is indeed lower in the presence of annuities.
To zoom in more on the role of bequest motives we also compare the impact
of opening up an annuity market in the presence of stronger bequest motives. To
this end, first consider column 3 which is the benchmark equilibrium with stronger
bequest motives (i.e., higher η). Then in column 4 we introduce the annuity mar-
ket. As before it leads to lower welfare and capital accumulation, but we see that
magnitude of the decline is smaller (1.3 % drop versus a 2.2 % drop). In that sense
bequest motives can be seen to dampen the negative general equilibrium implications
of opening up an annuity market. To understand the mechanism behind this effect
it serves to remember that the discrepancy between partial and general equilibrium
consequences of annuitization is mainly driven by the loss of intergenerational trans-
fers going from older to younger generations. However, with strong bequest motives
individuals make less use of the annuity market – as can be seen by the lower share of
total assets held in the form of annuities – and, therefore, the impact of opening up
an annuity market is dampened. Nevertheless, the impact of opening up the annuity
market remains a burden to individual welfare and capital accumulation.
4.4 Further Analysis
The preceding analysis has shown that bequest motives dampen the negative gen-
eral equilibrium consequences of opening up an annuity market. In what follows we
analyze two elements of this relationship further. First, in light of the many papers
focusing on annuity market imperfections (for instance, Hansen and İmrohoroğlu
(2008), Lockwood (2012) and Heijdra and Mierau (2012)), we analyze the impact of
opening up a imperfect annuity market. Second, following Pecchenino and Pollard
(1997) and Heijdra et al. (2017b) we consider the impact of limiting the amount of
assets that individuals can annuitize.
4.4.1 Imperfect Annuities
While hitherto we have considered that if an annuity market is opened, its is actuar-
ially fair, we now consider one in which, for some reason, the annuity premium is not
actuarially fair. Essentially, this implies that the annuity premium now becomes:
1 + rAt+1 =
1 + rt+1
µ
(1− (1− λ)(1− µ)), 0 < λ < 1, (4.4.1)
where λ is an omnibus imperfection term that can capture numerous reasons as to
why the annuity market is imperfect (see, Lockwood (2012) for a similar approach).
Chapter 4 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
Figure 4.2: Imperfect Annuities




















While in our companion paper (Heijdra et al., 2017a) we study various micro ori-
gins of annuity market imperfection, for the current purpose we assume that, for
exhibition purposes, the imperfection arises from administration costs.4
Leaving technicalities aside we trace out the expected utility levels from opening
up an annuity market with varying degrees of imperfection in Figure 4.2. There
we see that for a grossly imperfect annuity market, individuals do not annuitize
at all so that there is no difference between opening up an annuity market or not.
This result echoes the early analysis of Lockwood (2012) who emphasizes that the
substantial difference between the actuarially fair price of annuities and the actual
price of annuities goes some way in accounting for the annuity puzzle. Indeed, in the
presence of bequest motives, individuals attach a positive value to their bequests so
that in order to surrender them to the annuity firm they need to be compensated at
a substantial margin.
Considering ever more perfect annuities we observe that utility quickly drops as
individuals start annuitizing their assets, leading to the loss of accidental bequests
outlined above. Eventually, however, the share of assets annuitized becomes so sub-
stantial that an increase in the annuity premium (i.e., a decrease of the imperfection)
leads to a welfare increase. In sum, we observe that having access to a perfect annuity
market is not necessarily better than having access to an imperfect annuity market.
Because the imperfect annuity market acts so as to restrain individuals from annu-
itizing their assets, having a less-than-perfect annuity market diminishes the adverse
general equilibrium consequences of opening up an the annuity market.
4In order not to allow a leak into the model, we allow the administration costs to be redistributed
as lump-sum transfer to the young together with the bequest.
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Figure 4.3: Imperfect Annuities
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4.4.2 Restricted Access to Annuities
We impose a limit on the share of assets that can be annuitized and consider whether
setting this limit to below what individuals would chose can lead to a welfare gain
from opening up an annuity market. Following Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) and
Heijdra et al. (2017), we restrict the share of assets that may be annuitized to
ψ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that individuals face an additional constraint:
At = ψ(At + St). (4.4.2)
As above we trace out the welfare consequences of imposing such a constraint
in Figure ??. There we see that for values of ψ close to 1 the constraint is not
binding and individuals simply chose the share of annuities as before. In line with the
numerical example above we find that for sufficiently larger ψ, individuals annuitize
about 65% of their assets. If, however, ψ is smaller than the share of assets that
individuals voluntarily annuitze, we observe that the welfare loss from opening up
an annuity market gradually, and monotonically, becomes smaller.
4.5 Conclusion
Using a tractable two-period overlapping generations model we consider the role of
annuities and bequests in general equilibrium. We highlight that bequests increase
capital accumulation because they effectuate an intergenerational transfer from the
old to the young. Importantly, we show that also when bequest motives are taken into
account, opening up an annuity market will lead to a decrease in capital accumulation
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and welfare. We do, however, observe that the impact of opening up the annuity
market is dampened by the presence of bequest motives. Nevertheless, our results
substantiate the insight that basing public policy concerning annuities on partial
equilibrium models of annuitization is potentially misguided.
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4.A Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. There exists a unique, stable and non-trivial steady state at k(t) =
k.
If a steady-state equilibrium of the model satisfying k(t) = k exists, it is a solution















Rearranging (4.A.1), we have:






Hence the steady-state capital intensity k(t) = k is also a solution to the following
equation:
Ω(k) = Γ(k), (4.A.3)
where Ω(k) and Γ(k) are defined as:
Ω(k) =









(1− µ) + µ ησ1+ησ
]
, 0 < α < 1. From Equation (4.2.15) and (4.2.16) we
have:
Z(k) =
(1− µ)BU (k) + µBI(k)
1 + n
,
Z(k) = α(1 + r(k))
φ(r(k))
[










Assume that the threshold wealth is a fraction of the wage rate:







Thus Γ(k) is given by:
Γ(k) =
[
(1− (1−α)θ˜1+n )(1− ε)A+ αεA
]
kε + α(1− δ)k
1 + n
. (4.A.7)
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We write φ(k) in terms of capital intensity as:
φ(k) =
1
(φ1 + kε−1)1−σφ0 + 1
, (4.A.8)




φ1 ≡ 1− δ
εA
. (4.A.10)
Lemma 4.A.1. [Properties of the Γ(k) function] The function Γ(k) has the following
properties:











> 0 for k > 0;
(iii) Γ′′(k) = −
(1− ε)ε
[




< 0 for k > 0;
(iv) lim
k→0







Obvious by differentiation. ■













Ω′(k) = φ1−σ1 φ0 + 1.
Proof.





k + θ(1+r(k))(1+n) (1− φ(k))
φ(k)
= 0, (4.A.11)








ε−1)1−σφ0 + 1] = 0, (4.A.12)
lim
k→0
(1 + r(k))φ(k) = lim
k→0
εAkε−1 + 1− δ
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To prove part (ii) we define γ(k) ≡ θ1+r(k) , which has the following properties:
γ′(k) =
θ˜ε(1− ε)Akε−1
εAkε−1 + 1− δ +
θ˜(1− ε)Akεε(1− ε)Akε−2


















εAkε−1 + 1− δ +
θ˜(1− ε)Akεε(1− ε)Akε−2





















εAkε−1 + 1− δ +
θ˜(1− ε)Akεε(1− ε)Akε−2
(εAkε−1 + 1− δ)2
)
= 0. (4.A.19)
We can write Ω(k) as:
Ω(k) =
















































where we have used (4.A.6).
























(1− σ)(1− ε)(1− φ(k)) 1φ1k1−ε+1
.
(4.A.22)
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To prove part (iv) we use (4.A.18), (4.A.19) and:
lim
k→∞


























(1− σ)(1− ε)(1− φ(k)) 1φ1k1−ε+1
φ(k)
,
= φ1−σ1 φ0 + 1. (4.A.27)
■
The steady-state equation (4.A.3) has two roots. By Lemmas 4.A.1(i) and 4.A.2(i)








where we have used Lemma 4.A.2(iii). It follows that Γ(k) lies above Ω(k) for positive
values of k close to the origin. We know that Γ(k) is concave while Ω(k) is strictly
increasing. When k goes to infinity, they satisfy limk→∞ Γ′(k) = α(1−δ)1+n < 1 <
φ1−σ1 φ0 + 1 = limk→∞Ω
′(k). Hence there is a unique, finite nontrivial root, k. At
k(t) = k, Ω(k) cuts Γ(k) from below such that 0 < Γ′(k)/Ω′(k) < 1, thus proving
the stability of the nontrivial equilibrium.
92 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
4.B Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Capital intensity increases with the strength of the bequest motives
and decreases with threshold wealth:
∂k
∂η




In this Appendix we show that∂k∂θ < 0 and ∂k∂η > 0 given that r is bounded by a
certain upper limit. We differentiate the fundamental difference equation on both






































































From the definition of r, w and Z, we have:
∂r
∂η
= ε(ε− 1)Ωokε−2 ∂k
∂η







= ε(1− ε)Ωokε−1 ∂k
∂η











= α(1 + r)
∂k
∂η
+ α(ε− 1)(r + δ)∂k
∂η
. (4.B.7)




w + Z + θ1+r





We observe that ∂φ∂η > 0. As long as the denominator is positive, ∂k∂η is larger than
0. A sufficient condition for ∂k∂η > 0 to hold is:
r <
1+n
φ − (1− α)(1− ε)δ − α
(1− α)(1− ε) + α . (4.B.9)
■
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4.C Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. In a dynamically efficient economy for σ ∈ (0, 1) steady-state
capital intensity and welfare are lower in the presence of an annuity market.
First we show that in a dynamically efficient economy steady-state capital inten-
sity is lower in the presence of an annuity market.
Proof.
From Eq. (4.3.9) the steady-state capital intensity in each case is determined by:


















0 without annuity market
1 with annuity market
where φ(r, I) is the marginal propensity to save:
φ(r, 0) =
























Z(I) is the intergenerational government transfer:










Z(1) = α′(1 + r(kt))kt +
(α′ − 1)θ
1 + n




















1. To prove dkdI
∣∣
k(t)=k
< 0, we only need to show that ∂f(k,I)∂I < 0. In the following
we show that ∂f(k,I)∂I < 0 when 0 < σ < 1.
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First, we show that for any given k, φ(r, 0) > φ(r, 1):





















⇐ η(1− µ) + µ(1 + ησ)1/σ > (µ+ ησ)1/σ (4.C.7)
To show that Equation (4.C.7) holds, we define F (µ) ≡ (µ+ ησ)1/σ and G(µ) ≡
η(1− µ) + µ(1 + ησ)1/σ and show that G(µ)− F (µ) > 0. On the interval µ ∈ [0, 1],
we have:
F (0) = G(0) = η, (4.C.8)














(µ+ ησ)1/σ−2 > 0, (4.C.10)
G′(µ) = (1 + ησ)1/σ − η > 0, G′′(µ) = 0. (4.C.11)
G(µ) is strictly increasing and linear in µ while F (µ) is strictly increasing and
convex in µ on the interval µ ∈ [0, 1]. From Figure 4.4 we see that G(µ) > F (µ),
when µ ∈ (0, 1).
Then we show that for any given k, Z(0) > Z(1):
Z(0) > Z(1)⇐ α > α′ (4.C.12)
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From Equations (4.C.4) and (4.C.5) we have:








[1− µ+ ησ] (µ+ ησ)− (1 + ησ) ησ




(1 + ησ)(µ+ ησ)
. (4.C.13)
α > α′ holds when µ ∈ (0, 1).
Since φ(r, 0) > φ(r, 1) and Z(0) > Z(1) for any given k, we have ∂f(k,I)∂I < 0
when 0 < σ < 1, 0 < µ < 1. As illustrated in Figure 4.5, introducing the annuity
market rotates function f clockwise, which pins down a lower capital intensity in
the steady state kA. ■
Now we are ready to show that in a dynamically efficient economy welfare is
lower in the presence of an annuity market.
Proof.
We employ the Envelope Theorem to analyze the long-run welfare effects. The La-
grangian for the constrained welfare optimization is given by:
L(I) ≡ U(CY ) + 1− µ
1 + ρ

















BA −W − Z
]
(4.C.14)
96 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
The first order conditions are:
U ′(CY ) = λ (4.C.15)
µ
1 + ρ










W + Z − I(1− µ)
1 + r




BI [1− I(1− µ)]
1 + r
(4.C.18)


















































































We start from the steady state of the case without annuity market, such that I = 0.
Substituting the first order conditions (4.C.15) – (4.C.18) into (4.C.19) and evalu-























In the steady state of the case without annuity market, we have
∂r
∂I







= ε(1− ε)Ωokε−1 = (1− ε)(r + δ)∂k
∂I
, (4.C.22)
CO +BI = (1 + r)S = (1 + r)(1 + n)k. (4.C.23)
















where ∆ = (1−ε)(r−n)(r+δ)1+r > 0.
The annuity market crowds out unintended bequest (∂BU∂I < 0). As shown above,
it also crowds out intergenerational wealth transfer and capital intensity (∂Z∂I < 0 ,
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Chapter 5
Socially Optimal Fertility∗
*This chapter is based on Jiang (2019).
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5.1 Introduction
It is not hard to observe that there exists a positive externality of fertility on the old
age consumption as long as there is intergenerational transfer from the young to the
old. In an extreme case, as Samuelson (1958) assumes, where nothing will keep at all
in the future, the old generation would die at the beginning of their retirement years
if they fail to bribe the younger generation to support them. But if they succeed in
doing so, a higher fertility rate across the society would mostly likely benefit the old
generation. Meanwhile, Neoclassical growth theory predicts a negative externality
of fertility on the youth consumption, since increased population growth requires a
larger fraction of output to be invested as capital if the capital per capita is to be
maintained. Observing the two opposite effects of ‘intergenerational transfer’ and
‘capital dilution’, Samuelson (1975) proposed his celebrated Serendipity theorem,1
which shows the possibility of an interior optimal rate of population growth.
However, Samuelson’s solution, as pointed out by Deardorff (1976), is not opti-
mal in general. By using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, Deardorff
(1976) showed that Samuelson’s solution provides a global minimum of steady-state
utility instead of a maximum. But he also admitted that Samuelson’s optimal rate
of growth of population may indeed be optimal for sufficiently inelastic production
functions. Later Michel and Pestieau (1993) established conditions that imply an
interior solution. For CES utility and production functions with low elasticity of
substitution, the serendipity theorem holds.
Recent researches have paid more attention to the role of individual fertility
decisions in determining the optimal fertility rate and intergenerational transfer
scheme. Van Groezen et al. (2003) have shown that a pay-as-you-go pension system
combined with a child allowance scheme can lead to the social optimum. They argue
that the government needs a child allowance scheme to alter the number of offspring
because it wants to redistribute to the old through the pay-as-you-go pension system,
where the externalities of endogenous fertilities arise. Through the child allowance
scheme, the externalities of endogenous fertilities can be fully internalized. Abío et al.
(2004) claim that they have found the silver bullet—a pay-as-you-go pension system
linking pension benefits to the number of children—to induce both the optimal
capital stock and the optimal rate of population growth. Their inspiration comes
from the observation that ‘in most countries the system promises a pension which is
solely dependent on the evolution in wages and not on demographic evolution.’ They
believe that this single policy alone can lead the economy to reach the first-best
outcome.
This Chapter is most closely related to the work by Michel and Pestieau (1993).
We extend their work by assuming that fertility choices are endogenous rather than
exogenous. After all, it is more coincidental than general that the economy picks the
1Samuelson (1975) shows in his Serendipity Theorem that when the population growth rate is at
its optimal value, competitive equilibrium can bring the first-best outcome. The first best outcome
is called the most-golden golden-rule state, where both population growth rate and capital stock
reach their optimum.
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optimal growth rate and reaches the ‘most-golden golden rule’ lifetime state. In this
Chapter, individuals are assumed to derive direct utility from their offspring and are
free to choose the number of children they want subject to their budget constraints.
Another extension is that we introduce a welfare concept that postulates a social
welfare function that is dynamically consistent instead of Samuelson’s steady-state
welfare concept. We care not only about the steady-state welfare, but also about
the transitional dynamics of the economy. The dynamically consistent social welfare
function allows us to see clearly how the economy could be transformed, with appro-
priate design of government taxes, from the Laissez faire market economy to the first
best social optimum. Following Van Groezen et al. (2003) and Abío et al. (2004), we
combine a child tax and an intergenerational transfer (tax) to fix the two external-
ities of endogenous fertility: the ‘capital dilution’ effect and the ‘intergenerational
transfer’ effect. The socially optimal capital stock and fertility rate are determined
simultaneously after the implementation of the tax policies. Our analysis is one step
further based on previous research. In Van Groezen et al. (2003) and Abío et al.
(2004), they assume that the interest rate r is exogenously given, which precludes
any ‘capital dilution’ effect. It is based on this assumption that they show the laissez
faire market outcome without any government intervention is efficient. We relax this
assumption and allow r to be endogenously determined by the market. Furthermore,
they attribute the externality of fertility to government transfers across generations.
This paper, however, takes government transfers as a means to restore individual’s
incentives to save, which could potentially fix the externality of ‘capital dilution’
effect.
Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, the unmanaged market economy will
generally not end up in the ‘most-golden golden rule’ lifetime state. A plausibly
calibrated version of the model reveals that individuals save less than the socially
optimal capital stock as they ignore the ‘capital dilution’ effect. Furthermore, the
number of children they raise is more than socially optimal as they do not consider
the externalities of fertility: the ‘intergenerational transfer’ effect begs them to raise
more children whilst the ‘capital dilution’ effect requires them to make fewer babies.2
Second, with appropriate design of government taxes, the managed market economy
could reach the first best social optimum. Through an intergenerational transfer tax,
the government induces the young to save more in case that the capital should be
diluted. Combining with a child tax, which leads individuals to internalize the social
externalities of fertility, the first best social optimum is decentralized by the man-
aged market economy. Third, the transition from an unmanaged market economy
to the first best social optimum is an improvement for all generations except the old
generation at the shock. The capital per capita is predetermined at impact. After
the implementation of government taxes it rises monotonically to the new steady
state in about 4 to 5 periods (120 - 150 years). During the same time the fertility
rate is induced to decrease and settle at the new steady state by the child tax. Most
importantly, after the first period, the individual welfare level has ever been increas-
2In our calibration of the model the latter effect dominates the former.
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ing during the transition. All generations except the old generation at the shock will
benefit from the implementation of government taxes to transform the unmanaged
market economy to the first best social optimum.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the laissez
faire market economy where we introduce the endogenous fertility. The benchmark
model is calibrated with plausible structural parameters. Section 3 analyzes the so-
cial welfare of the economy. By solving the social planner’s problem, we compare
two concepts of social optimization: the Samuelson Social Welfare and Social Wel-
fare Function. The latter is preferred since it considers all generations instead of the
steady state generation only. Section 4 decentralizes the first best social optimum
from managed market economy with government taxes. Not only do people enjoy a
higher welfare level in the first best social optimum in the steady state, the tran-
sitional dynamics shows us that the transitional process is also an improvement in
the long run. Section 5 concludes.
5.2 Model
We consider a two-period overlapping generations model, where in each period (t =
1, 2, 3...), the economy consists of a younger (‘youth’, superscript y) and an older
(‘old age’, superscript o) generation. At time t the economy consists of Nt young
individuals. We assume that all individuals are identical. Individuals, over their life
cycle, must decide how many children to raise, how much to consume and how
much to save for retirement. In the production sector, we assume that there is a
large number of firms which produce homogeneous goods in a perfectly competitive
market.
5.2.1 Consumers
All individuals are identical (symmetric case) so we describe the representative in-
dividual. At time t, an individual must decide on the number of children (nt), how
much to consume (cyt ) and how much to save (st) in the beginning of the first period.
In youth she is endowed with one unit of time, which she distributes between work-
ing (1 − znt) and raising children (znt). In old age she works part time as a result
of mandatory retirement (λ). Her old-age consumption (cot+1) comes from both her
savings and her old-age wages. The periodic budget constraints are given by:
cyt + st = wt(1− znt), (5.2.1)
cot+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + λwt+1, (5.2.2)
where 1+rt+1 is the rate of return on her savings, wt and wt+1 are her wages during
youth and old age, respectively.
We assume that an individual not only derives utility from her consumption, but
also from her offspring.3 The lifetime utility of an individual with nt children is given
3For utility functions that include the quality and quantity of children, see Moav (2005).
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by:
Λyt ≡ V (nt) + U(cyt , cot+1), (5.2.3)







1−ζ , for σ = 1[
ζ(cyt )
1−1/σ + (1− ζ)(cot+1)1−1/σ
]1/(1−1/σ)
, for σ ̸= 1 (5.2.4)
and the weights are defined as:
ζ ≡ 1
1 + β
, 1− ζ ≡ β
1 + β
(5.2.5)
where β is the individual’s time preference discount factor (0 < β < 1). Utility
derived from fertility is given by the felicity function V (·)4:
V (nt) ≡ γ
θ
[nt − nmin]θ , 0 < θ < 1, nmin > 1− δ. (5.2.7)
This functional form incorporates the assumption that a minimum amount of off-
spring is necessary to each individual. For a visualization of the felicity function, see
Figure 5.1. Note that preferences are additively separable in nt and (cyt , cot+1).
5.2.2 Production
We assume perfection competition in the goods market. The production technology











t + (1− α)l1−1/ξt
]1/(1−1/ξ)
, for ξ ̸= 1 (5.2.8)
where Ω is total factor productivity, α is the capital share of output, kt ≡ KtNt and
yt ≡ YtNt are capital and output per capita, respectively. The intensive form of labor
supply is defined as:
lt ≡ 1− znt + λ
nt−1
. (5.2.9)
Firms choose the amount of labor supply and capital stock to maximize the profit.





t + (1− α)L1−1/ξt
]1/(1−1/ξ)
− (rt + δ)Kt − wtLt. (5.2.10)
4We choose this function because it helps in avoiding corner solutions that result from the
iso-elastic function (especially if λ > 0):
V (nt) ≡ γ n
1−1/θ
t − 1
1− 1/θ . (5.2.6)
5Since the weights in preferences and technology add up to unity, the CES function converges
to the Cobb-Douglas specification (both for σ = 1 and ξ = 1).
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Figure 5.1: Utility from offspring
Minimum desired felicity
















Note This is a power function featuring a minimum desired level of offspring,
nmin > 0.
Simplifying the first-order conditions, the factor prices are given by (expressed per
young individual):














This model is completed by a description of the capital market equilibrium:
st = ntkt+1, (5.2.13)
where equation (5.2.13) says that capital next period comes from savings in the
current period, which is the full income left after consumption and time cost of
child:
st = wt − (zwtnt + cyt ). (5.2.14)
In a closed economy factor prices will ensure that the capital stock is strictly positive,




+ zwtnt = H
y
t , (5.2.15)
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where Hyt is human wealth at birth:




Individuals choose cyt , cot+1 and nt to maximize the lifetime utility (5.2.3) subject to
budget constraints (5.2.15). The Lagrangian is given by:
Lh ≡V (nt) +
[
ζ(cyt )











we obtain the first-order conditions:
∂Lh
∂nt























1−1/σ + (1− ζ)(cot+1)1−1/σ
]1/(σ−1)
. (5.2.22)










Intuitively, equation (5.2.23) is the Euler equation. Substituting the Euler equation
into xt, we can solve for the fertility decision from Equation (5.2.24):










Note that there is no wealth effect in the fertility decision. When the time cost of
children or the rate of return form savings increase, parents are going to raise less
children. It is easy to see that ∂nt/∂(zwt) < 0 and ∂nt/∂rt+1 < 0 regardless of the
magnitude of σ. The market equilibrium model is summarized in Table 5.1.
5.2.4 Parameterization Market Equilibrium
To visualize the main features of the economy, we parameterize the model by choos-
ing plausible values for structural parameters. Here we calibrate the full version of
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Table 5.1: Market equilibrium in the fertility model










= [β (1 + rt+1)]
σ
























t + (1− α)l1−1/ξt
]1/(1−1/ξ)
lt = 1− znt + λ
nt−1
Note Variables: saving of the young st, fertility rate nt, labour supply lt, wage rate
wt, real interest rate rt, current capital stock kt, youth consumption cyt , (planned)
old-age consumption cot+1, output yt. Individuals are endowed with perfect foresight
regarding future variables.
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the model as stated in Table 5.1. Hence, we assume that 0 < δ < 1, z > 0, λ > 0
and γ > 0. First, we postulate plausible values for the substitution elasticity in con-
sumption and production (σ = 0.7, ξ = 0.7), the annual capital depreciation rate
(δa = 0.06), the annual growth rate of the population (na = 0.01), the social annual
rate of time preference (ρG,a = 0.02) and the target annual interest rate (rˆa = 0.05).
The output is normalized at unity: yˆ = 1. The output share of labour income is
targeted at wˆlˆ/yˆ = ωˆL = 0.7. The minimum desired offspring is set at nmin = 0.9.
Second, we set the length of each period to be 30 years and compute the values for
nˆ, rˆ and δ.6 The time cost of fertility is set at znˆ = φn = 0.2 (six years). Labour
supply per individual is lˆ = 1 − φn + λnˆ . Finally, we can compute (kˆ, α, Ω) from
the competitive conditions for capital demand, labour share and output for a given
value of ξ:















αkˆ1−1/ξ + (1− α)lˆ1−1/ξ
]1/(1−1/ξ)
. (5.2.28)
The resulting structural parameters are reported in Table 5.2. With the structural
parameters we are able to compute the wage rate, savings and consumption:






sˆ = nˆkˆ, (5.2.30)
cˆy = wˆ(1− znˆ)− sˆ, (5.2.31)
cˆo = (1 + rˆ)sˆ+ λwˆ. (5.2.32)









The child preference parameter γ is used as a calibration parameter, i.e. it is set at










6Note that nˆ = (1+na)30 = 1.3478, rˆ = (1+ra)30−1 = 3.3219 and δ = 1− (1−δa)30 = 0.8437.
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Table 5.2: Structural parameters: General case
σ substitution elasticity in consumption 0.7000
ξ substitution elasticity in production 0.7000
α capital efficiency parameter 0.1148
β private time preference parameter c 0.5722
ρa pure annual rate of time preference (percent) i 1.8783
βG social discount factor 0.5521
nmin minimum desired offspring 0.9000
δa annual capital depreciation rate (percent) 6.0000
δ capital depreciation factor i 0.8437
Ω scale factor production function c 1.4767
γ taste for offspring parameter c 0.0435
θ curvature coefficient for children 0.3000
z time cost of children 0.1484
λ fraction of time worked in old age 0.5000
Note The parameters labelled ‘c’ are calibrated as is explained in the text. Those
labelled ‘i’ are implied by other parameters. The remaining parameters are postu-
lated a priori. The value for ρa follows from β, by noting that each model period
represents 30 years.
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Table 5.3: Allocation and welfare in the fertility model
(a) ME (b) SSO (c) SWF (c) SWF (c) SWF
βG = 0.4521 βG = 0.5521 βG = 0.6521
yˆ 1.0000 1.6573 1.2003 1.3189 1.4197
kˆ 0.0720 0.3692 0.1222 0.1633 0.2076
nˆ 1.3478 0.9864 1.2190 1.1462 1.0896
nˆa 1.0000% −0.0456% 0.6623% 0.4558% 0.2865 %
rˆ 3.3219 −0.0136 1.6963 1.0761 0.6709
rˆa 5.0000% −0.0456% 3.3615% 2.4648% 1.7260%
wˆ 0.5978 0.9929 0.7240 0.7940 0.8521
cˆy 0.3812 0.8044 0.5070 0.5832 0.6489
cˆo 0.7184 0.5390 0.6868 0.6579 0.6288
lˆ 1.1710 1.3605 1.2293 1.2661 1.2972
lˆy 0.8000 0.8536 0.8191 0.8299 0.8383
lˆo 0.3710 0.5069 0.4102 0.4362 0.4589
Λˆy 0.5847 0.7593 0.6396 0.6872 0.7215
Note Panel (a) summarizes the steady-state equilibrium for the unmanaged market
economy. Panel (b) is the Samuelson social optimum. Panel (c) is the SWF social
optimum.
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Finally, we check if the model is in equilibrium. In the steady-state equilibrium, both
the resource constraint and budget constraint must be satisfied:














The individual welfare has been estimated from steady-state values of individual
consumption and fertility. The main features of the steady-state market equilibrium
are reported in column (a) of Table 5.3.
5.3 Welfare Analysis
In this section we investigate two concepts of social optimization. The first concept
is the oldest one due to Samuelson. It is later discussed and demonstrated further
by Deardoff (1976) and Michel and Pestieau (1993). It simply maximizes the life-
time utility of a young individual in the steady state. The second welfare concept
postulates a dynamically consistent social welfare function, where the social planner
treats equally all individuals within but not across generations.
5.3.1 Samuelson Social Welfare
Samuelson (1975) and many other writers in this field maximize steady-state welfare
of a representative young individual. To investigate the existence of an interior so-
lution for optimal fertility n this is a useful first step. The social planner maximizes
the objective function:










subject to the resource constraints:




where y = f(k, l) and l = 1− zn+ λn .
We use the insights of Michel and Pestieau (1993) for further investigation. Define





k, 1− zn+ λ
n
)
− (n+ δ − 1)k. (5.3.3)




k, 1− zn+ λ
n
)
= n+ δ − 1. (5.3.4)
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. ξ ̸= 1
(5.3.5)
Hence the optimal resources are given by:
Φ∗(n) = Ω
[





− (n+ δ − 1)k∗(n).
(5.3.6)
Michel and Pestieau (1993, P. 355) claim that Φ(n) is decreasing in n (for z = λ =
1− δ = 0).
Now let’s define the indirect utility function as:
Ψ(n) ≡ V (n) + Ψc(n), (5.3.7)

















The first-order conditions for the optimization of the indirect utility of the consump-
tion part yields the following Euler equation:
co = (βn)σcy, (5.3.10)









Substitute cy and co into the indirect utility function we get:
Ψc(n) =
Φ(n)(1 + β)






. for σ ̸= 1 (5.3.13)
For an interior optimum we need Ψ′(n∗) = 0 and Ψ′′(n∗) < 0 for some n∗ > 0 subject
to the constraint. The Lagrangian of the social planner’s problem under Samuelson
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social optimum is given by:











f(k, 1− zn+ λ
n






The first-order conditions for youth and old age consumption, number of children
and capital intensity are given by:
∂Ls
∂cy
= xζ(cy)−1/σ − µ = 0, (5.3.15)
∂Ls
∂co




















= f1(k, l)− (δ + n− 1) = 0, (5.3.18)
where x is defined as:
x ≡
[
ζ(cy)1−1/σ + (1− ζ)(co)1−1/σ
]1/(σ−1)
. (5.3.19)







Thus, from Equation (5.3.15) µ is given by:








The optimal conditions characterizing the interior maximum are given by:
nk = f(k, l) + (1− δ)k − [1 + βσnσ−1] cy, (5.3.22)













f1(k, l) = δ + n− 1, (5.3.24)
l = 1− zn+ λ
n
, (5.3.25)
which can be solved for n, k, cy and l (x, µ and co follow readily).
To compare the Samuelson social welfare (SSO) with the market equilibrium
(ME), we first write down the optimal conditions determining the number of children
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= zf2(k, l), (5.3.27)
where we have used Equation (5.2.12) and (5.2.24). On the left-hand side is the ratio
between the marginal utility of an additional child and the marginal utility from an
extra unit of consumpton; on the right-hand side is the relative cost of an additional
child to consumption8.
In the laissez-faire market equilibrium, individuals do not take into account the
capital dilution effect, which is captured by the term k in (5.3.26) and increases the
cost of an additional child. When the number of children increases, a higher capital
stock is needed for them to be productive in the next period. Individuals ignore the
fact that more children should have induced them to save more. Another factor that
individuals do not take into account is the intergenerational transfer effect. More
children means that there are more working individuals to support each retired
individual. Therefore, the old-age labour supply becomes a smaller fraction of total
labour supply (which is captured by λn2 f2(k, l)) and a higher output in the future is
shared with the same number of pensioners (which is captured by − con2 ). Since old-
age consumption (co) is higher than old-age income (λf2(k, l)), the intergenerational
transfer effect reduces the cost of an additional child, − co−λf2(k,l)n2 < 0. This is also
verified in Table 5.3 (co = 0.5390 > λf2(k, l) = λw = 0.4965). However, it is still
unknown to us which effect dominates the other.
From Table 5.3, we find that the capital dilution effect dominates the intergen-
erational transfer effect, (k = 0.3692 > co−λf2(k,l)n2 = 0.0437). As the cost of an
additional child increases, the marginal utility of each child must rise, which leads
parents to choose a smaller number of children: n is reduced from 1.3478 under ME
to 0.9864 under SSO. Individuals save more for the next period (k increases from
0.0720 to 0.3692) and produce a higher output (y increases from 1.0000 to 1.6573)
under SSO. They also enjoy a much higher youth consumption (cy increases from
0.3812 to 0.8044) and slightly lower old-age consumption (co decreases from 0.7184
to 0.5390). And because the social planner internalizes the external effects of fertil-
ity, individuals enjoy a higher welfare level under SSO (Λy increases from 0.5847 to
0.7593).
5.3.2 Social Welfare Function
Social welfare function weights the generations in such a way that the social opti-
mum is dynamically consistent. Specifically, as was stressed by Calvo and Obstfeld
7U1 (cy , co) is defined as:
U1 (c




8The marginal cost of consumption is 1.
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(1988), it is imperative that the old generation in the planning period is treated
appropriately by applying reverse discounting. Hence, the social welfare function is
given by:

















+ (1− ζ) (cot )1−1/σ
]1/(1−1/σ)]













+ (1− ζ) (cot+2)1−1/σ]1/(1−1/σ)]+ . . .
(5.3.28)
where βG is the social planner’s discount factor (0 < βG < 1). Recall that in Equation
(5.2.5) β is defined as the private discount factor. Note that we apply a Mill-type
social welfare function as in Van Groezen et al. (2003).
The economy-wide resource constraint is given by:




The production function per young individual is defined as:




t + (1− α)l1−1/ξt
]1/(1−1/ξ)
, (5.3.30)
where labour supply at time t is lt = 1− znt + λnt−1 .
At time t the social planner chooses time paths for cyτ , coτ , nτ and kτ+1 (for
τ = t, t+1, ...) in order to maximize SW t subject to the resource constraint and the
time-cost of children constraint. The initial conditions are kt, cyt−1 and nt−1.











+ (1− ζ) (cot )1−1/σ
]1/(1−1/σ)]


















kt, 1− znt + λ
nt−1
)









kt+1, 1− znt+1 + λ
nt
)





+ . . .
(5.3.31)
The first-order conditions for youth and old age consumption, number of children
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= V ′(nt) + βGµt+1
cot+1 − λf2(kt+1, lt+1)
n2t




= −µtnt + βGµt+1 [f1(kt+1, lt+1) + 1− δ] = 0, (5.3.35)





+ (1− ζ) (cot+1)1−1/σ]1/(σ−1) . (5.3.36)
Thus we can derive the optimality conditions for the first-best social optimum
(FBSO):


















µtnt = βGµt+1 [f1(kt+1, lt+1) + 1− δ] , (5.3.40)
lt = 1− znt + λ
nt−1
. (5.3.41)














and it follows that:
xˆ = (cˆy)1/σ
[
























9The first-order conditions for other periods τ = t+ 1, t+ 2, ... are similar.
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The optimal conditions characterizing the interior maximum are:










V ′(nˆ) = µˆ
[













f1(kˆ, lˆ) + 1− δ
]
, (5.3.48)
lˆ = 1− znˆ+ λ
nˆ
, (5.3.49)
which can be solved for nˆ, kˆ, cˆy, and lˆ ( xˆ, µˆ and cˆo follow readily).
When we compare the Social welfare function (SWF) equilibrium with the market
equilibrium (ME) and Samuelson social welfare (SSO) equilibrium, it is convenient
to write down the optimal conditions concerning the number of children. In the
steady-state FBSO we have:
V ′(n)
U1(cy, co)









where we have used Equations (5.3.38), (5.3.42) and (5.3.47). Comparing the opti-
mality condition (5.3.50) with condition (5.3.27), we find that in the laissez-faire mar-
ket equilibrium (ME), individuals do not consider the capital dilution effect, which is
captured by the term k. Each additional child needs exactly the same per capita cap-
ital to keep the per capita production at the former level when they join the labour
force. Another factor that individuals fail to internalize is the intergenerational trans-
fer effect, which is captured by the term in the bracket in (5.3.50). As more children
are born, there will be abundant labour force in the next period, thus old-age labour
force will be less important (which is captured by λf2(k,l)n2 ), and more production will
be shared with each retired individual (which is captured by con2 ). The capital dilution
effect increases the cost of each additional child (k = 0.1633 > 0), and the intergen-
erational transfer effect reduces the cost of each additional child (− co−λf2(k,l)n2 < 0),
which is verified by Table 5.3 (co = 0.6579 > λf2(k, l) = λw = 0.3970). The intergen-
erational transfer effect is also discounted by the social discount factor βG = 0.5521.
Once we substitute the fertility rate n = 1.1462 under SWF in Table 5.3 into the
intergenerational transfer effect, we find that the capital dilution effect dominates
the intergenerational transfer effect (k = 0.1633 > βG c
o−λf2(k,l)
n2 = 0.1096), the cost
of an additional child rises. The marginal utility from an extra child increases with
the cost of an additional child. Therefore, under SWF, parents choose a smaller
number of children compared to ME: n is reduced from 1.3478 to 1.1462. A higher
capital stock is saved for the next period under SWF (k increases from 0.0720 to
0.1633), which leads to a higher output level (y increases from 1.0000 to 1.3189).
Moreover, individuals enjoy a higher youth consumption (cy increases from 0.3812
to 0.5832) and a slightly lower old-age consumption (co decreases from 0.7184 to
0.6579). They also enjoy a higher welfare level under SWF (Λy increases from 0.5847
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to 0.6872) since the social planner internalizes the capital dilution effect and the
intergenerational transfer effect.
To note the differences between the SWF equilibrium and the SSO equilibrium,
we examine conditions (5.3.50) and (5.3.26). We find that under SWF the inter-
generational transfer effect is discounted by the social discount factor βG. Because
the output in the future has a smaller weight (discounted by the social planner) in
the utility function, individuals decide to save less, which leads to a smaller capital
stock (k reduces from 0.3692 to 0.1633) and smaller total output (y reduces from
1.6573 to 1.3189). Because of a smaller capital stock under SWF, the overall exter-







= 0.0537) is much smaller than in SSO
(k + λf2(k,l)n2 − c
o
n2 = 0.3255), so that the price of an additional child declines. The
lower cost of each extra child leads to a higher fertility rate in SWF (n increases
from 0.9864 to 1.1462). Comparing to SSO, individuals in SWF consume less in
youth (cy declines from 0.8044 to 0.5832) and slightly more in old age (co increases
from 0.5390 to 0.6579). They also enjoy a slightly lower welfare level in SWF as the
social planner discounts future utilities (Λy decreases from 0.7593 to 0.6872 ).
We prefer SWF over SSO as the objective function for social welfare analysis.
The SSO focuses on the steady state while SWF considers all generations and is
dynamically consistent. Since the SWF function is dynamic, it provides us the tools
to analyze individual decisions (transfers, savings, etc.) across generations. Further-
more, the SWF function puts a smaller weight on future consumption and income,
which is also consistent across time. In the following analysis we are going to take
the SWF equilibrium as the first best social optimum (FBSO).
5.4 Child taxes and lump-sum transfers
5.4.1 Market Economy with Lump-sum Taxes
We notice that the resource constraints are exactly the same under market economy
(ME) and social welfare function (SWF) economy. The output and remaining capital
are either consumed in the current period or to be saved as future capital to produce
in the next period. If the government could design a tax scheme such that individuals
are induced to choose the optimal number of children and golden-rule savings rate,
the first best social optimum (FBSO) can be replicated from the market economy
(ME) with government taxes.
Assume that individual utility function has not been changed:
Λyt ≡ V (nt) + U(cyt , cot+1), (5.4.1)
The government taxes ψtwt for each child, and redistributes the tax as a pay-roll
subsidy wtηt to each individual. An individual receives a subsidy T yt in youth and
has to pay a lump-sum tax T ot+1 to the government in old age. The government has
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a balanced budget:





The individual budget constraint can now be written as:
cyt + st + ψtwtnt = wt(1− znt + ηt) + T yt , (5.4.4)
cot+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + λwt+1 + T
o
t+1, (5.4.5)










Thus the Lagrangian is given by:
Lyt ≡ V (nt) +
[
ζ(cyt )
















We obtain the first-order conditions:
∂Lyt
∂nt













)1/σ − λyt1 + rt+1 = 0, (5.4.10)




1−1/σ + (1− ζ)(cot+1)1−1/σ
]1/(σ−1)
. (5.4.11)
From the first-order conditions we obtain optimality conditions:
cot+1
cyt








= (z + ψt)wt. (5.4.13)
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Combining the Euler equation and the lifetime budget constraint we get:
cyt =
1
1 + βσ(1 + rt+1)σ−1
[







st = ntkt+1 =
βσ(1 + rt+1)
σ−1
1 + βσ(1 + rt+1)σ−1
[wt(1− znt) + T yt ]
− 1








cot+1 = [β(1 + rt+1)]
σ
cyt . (5.4.16)
From Eqs. (5.4.13) and (5.4.15) we find that the intergenerational tax T y has been
designed to induce individuals to choose the golden-rule savings rate. When individ-
uals decide to save more or less than the social optimal, the government can adjust
the tax T y to lead them to save at the social optimal. The child tax ψ has been de-
signed to induce individuals to have the optimal number of children. Interestingly,
we find that these two taxes work in tandem with each other. Neither tax could work
without the complement of the other. Together they pin down the optimal capital
stock and fertility rate for society.
5.4.2 Steady-state Decentralization
Now we are going to decentralize the stead-state first best social optimal (BFSO)
economy from the market economy with the help of government taxes. We will show
that, with appropriate design of government taxes, the managed market economy
will reach the first best social optimum.
Recall from the social welfare function (SWF) economy:
µtnt = βGµt+1 [f1(kt+1, lt+1) + 1− δ] , (5.4.17)
In the steady-state µt = µ∗ for all t, so we have:
nˆ = βG
[
f1(kˆ, lˆ) + 1− δ
]
= βG(1 + rˆ), (5.4.18)
where kˆ is the socially optimal capital stock per young worker. To replicate the SWF
equilibrium, we first use the lump-sum transfer T yt to make sure that individual
savings will increase. Consequently, the capital stock kt will increase and finally
converge to kt = kˆ. Meanwhile we use the child tax ψt to induce individuals to have
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) = (z + ψt)f2(kt, lt), (5.4.20)
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where we have used equations (5.4.13) – (5.4.15) . In the steady state we obtain:
n˜k˜ =
βσ(1 + r˜)σ−1
1 + βσ(1 + r˜)σ−1
[
w˜(1− zn˜) + T˜ yt
]
− 1
1 + βσ(1 + r˜)σ−1
[






= (z + ψt)f2(k˜, l˜), (5.4.22)
The planner sets the capital stock per young worker and fertility rate equal to kˆ and
nˆ, respectively. Then we will have k˜ = kˆ, r˜ = rˆ, w˜ = wˆ, n˜ = nˆ and l˜ = lˆ. Taking
into account of government budget constraint, there must exist a lump-sum tax on
(transfer to) the young T˜ y and a child tax ψ˜ such that the right capital stock kˆ and
fertility rate nˆ are chosen in the market economy:
nˆkˆ =
βσ(1 + rˆ)σ−1
1 + βσ(1 + rˆ)σ−1
[
wˆ(1− znˆ) + T˜ y
]
− 1
1 + βσ(1 + rˆ)σ−1
[












Where the T˜ y and ψ˜ are the policy instruments. Rearranging the equations, we find:
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We can also verify that, in this managed market equilibrium, the consumption will
be the same as in the SWF equilibrium. In the steady state, the capital market










= wˆlˆ + (1 + rˆ − nˆ)kˆ,
= y(kˆ, lˆ) + (1− nˆ− δ)kˆ. (5.4.27)










Chapter 5 The Macroeconomic effects of longevity risk
Since the resource constraint and the Euler equation are exactly the same as in the
SWF equilibrium, the consumption in the managed market equilibrium must be kept
the same.
We have shown that the managed market economy with two appropriate tax
policies could reach the first best social optimum (FBSO). This is because the taxes
have led individuals to take into account the externalities of fertility: the capital
dilution effect and the intergenerational transfer effect. By designing a lump-sum
tax that transfers resources from the old to the young, the government has induced
individuals to save more, which internalizes the capital dilution effect. By putting
a tax on each child, the government has led individuals to reconsider the marginal
social cost of children. In our simulations, we find that the capital dilution effect
more than offsets the intergenerational transfer effect, which implies raising an extra
child is more costly for the society. When fertility rate is endogenous rather than
exogenous, the fertility choice and savings decision interact with each other. These
two optimal choices are determined simultaneously once the two tax polices have
been implemented.
5.4.3 Transitional Dynamics
We have shown that, with appropriate design of government taxes, the managed
market economy will reach the socially optimal equilibrium in the steady state. Now
we ask the following question: is it better to move the market economy to the SWF
equilibrium with the nudge of government taxes? If we compare the ME equilibrium
and SWF equilibrium in the steady state in Table (5.3), the answer is probably yes.
In the SWF equilibrium we have higher output, higher capital stock, higher wage
rate, higher labor participation, and more importantly, higher welfare level (in terms
of lifetime utility) . This is mainly because the fertility rate has become lower: the
social externalities of fertility choices have been internalized by the family with the
incentives of government taxes.
But the steady-state comparison only reveals us a corner of the picture. We also
care about the welfare of generations of people who are affected by the tax policy.
To find out wether this tax policy is Pareto improving for all generations we study
the transitional dynamic effects of introducing the government taxes. Substituting
in the numbers of the SWF equilibrium we can calculate the values of the policy
instruments:
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Substitute the values of T˜ y and ψ˜ into the managed market equilibrium model as
listed in Table (5.4). At shock-time t = 0, individuals face a child tax ψ which are
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Table 5.4: Managed Market equilibrium in the fertility model
cot+1 = c
y
t [β(1 + rt+1)]
σ
cot = λwt + T
o
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t + (1− α)l1−1/ξt
]1/(1−1/ξ)
lt = 1− znt + λ
nt−1
Note Variables: youth consumption cyt , (planned) old-age consumption cot+1, saving
of the young st, current capital stock kt, fertility rate nt, wage rate wt, real interest
rate rt, tax on the old T ot , output yt, labour supply lt.
redistributed to the family as a payroll subsidy, and each young individual receives
a government subsidy T y which are financed by taxing the old people T o. Using
Dynare, I compute the transition path from the unmanaged market equilibrium
(ME) to the first best social optimum (FBSO). In the steady state, as expected, the
managed market economy reaches the FBSO.
Figure (5.2) depicts some key features of the transition process. Panel (a) shows
that the capital per young worker starts at k˜ = 0.072 and converges to the FBSO
value of kˆ = 0.1633 in about 4 to 5 periods (120-150 years). Panel (b) shows that
the child tax induces each parent to have less children. The fertility rate declines
from n˜ = 1.3480 to nˆ = 1.1462. Panel (c) and (d) show that youth consumption
increases from c˜y = 0.3812 to cˆy = 0.5832 and old-age consumption decreases from
c˜o = 0.7184 to cˆo = 0.6579. This is mainly due to the fact that the government
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Figure 5.2: Transition from ME to FBSO
(a) Capital kˆt (b) Fertility nˆt
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Figure 5.3: Lump-sum transfers and individual welfare
(a) Transfers to the young Tˆ yt (b) Transfers to the old Tˆ ot
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transfers resources from the old to the young, leading young people to consume and
save more than before. Panel (e) and (f) show the subsequent changes in interest
rate and wage rate, which follows the change in capital stock. Interest rate declines
from r˜ = 3.3218 to rˆ = 1.0761 and wage rate rises from w˜ = 0.5978 to wˆ = 0.7940.
Figure (5.3) shows us the lump-sum transfers needed to decentralize the FBSO.
The government transfers resources from the old to the young. In the steady state
the young is subsidized by Tˆ yt = 0.1115 and the old is taxed by Tˆ ot = 0.1278. It
also illustrates the transition process of individual welfare: it first decrease from
Λ˜yt = 0.5847 to Λ˜yt = 0.5416, then increases monotonically to Λˆyt = 0.6872. This is
because the first generation—the old at the time of the shock—are taxed without
any compensation. Hence we arrive at the conclusion that the first generation is
going to suffer from the transition from the unmanaged market equilibrium to the
first best social optimum, while in the long run all other generations will benefit from
the transition. In the steady state, the social externalities of fertility – the capital
dilution effect and intergenerational transfer effect – have been fully internalized.
5.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter we have developed a two-period overlapping generations model which
features endogenous fertility and CES utility and production functions. Consumers
are assumed to derive direct utility from their offspring, and are free to choose
the number of children they want subject to their budget constraints. Following
Michel and Pestieau (1993), we find that there exists an interior solution for the
optimal fertility rate, given CES utility and production functions with low elasticity
of substitution. By a plausibly calibrated version of the model, we show that the
unmanaged market economy does not generally coincide with the first best social
optimum. In the laissez faire market economy, individuals do not take into account
the social externalities of fertility: when the fertility rate is too high, it requires a
larger fraction of output to be inserted into the capital formation to maintain the
capital-labour ratio, which is dubbed the ‘capital dilution’ effect; when the fertility
rate is too low, there will be too few young workers to support the old generation,
which is called the ‘intergenerational transfer’ effect.
We solved the social planner’s problem, which internalized the social externalities
of fertility. We compared two welfare concepts: the Samuelson Social Welfare (SSO)
concept and Social Welfare Function (SWF) concept. The SSO focuses on the steady
state generation whilst SWF considers all generations and discounts the utility of
future generations with a social discount factor βG. We prefer the SWF as the
objective function for the social welfare analysis as it provides us the convenience
to analyze individual choices across generations and gives us a better picture of the
transitional dynamics. In the SWF equilibrium (FBSO), individual welfare has been
enhanced due to the internalization of externalities of fertility.
The FBSO can be decentralized from the managed market economy with appro-
priate design of government tax and transfers. With a child tax and intergenerational
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lump-sum transfers, the market economy can replicate the FBSO. The intuition be-
hind is simple: the government tax and transfers have led individuals to take into
account the externalities of fertility. The golden-rule savings rate and the optimal
fertility rate are pinned down simultaneously once the government tax and transfers
have been introduced. More importantly, the introduction of government tax and
transfers yields a higher individual welfare level not only in the steady state, but all
generations after the shock will benefit from the policy as shown by the transitional
dynamics analysis. The transition from the laissez faire market economy to the fist
best social optimum is an improvement for future generations in the long run.
In this Chapter we have built and calibrated a model that verifies Samuelson’s
Serendipity theorem. We extend the work of Michel and Pestieau (1993) by intro-
ducing endogenous fertility decisions and a dynamically consistent Social Welfare
Function. We show that there exists an interior optimal fertility rate, which the
unmanaged market economy does not pick up automatically, but can be reached
from a managed market economy with the nudge of government tax and transfers.
Samuelson’s ‘most-golden golden-rule state’ can not only be reached by serendipity,
it can also be reached by the right government policies.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
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This thesis is a collection of micro-founded small macroeconomic models (and
conjugate micro models) attempting to shed light on the optimal financial and so-
cial arrangements for ageing.1 Specifically, we extended and enriched the Samuelson
(1958) - Diamond (1965) model by including lifetime uncertainty, asymmetric in-
formation, heterogenous individuals and endogenous fertility decisions to study the
insurance of longevity risk, optimal fertility rates for society and the macroeconomic
effects of private and public annuities in/without presence of bequests. Within a
minimal theoretical framework we carefully relax some stylized but unrealistic as-
sumptions behind the original overlapping-generations models (for instance, exoge-
nous fertility assumption) and explore the welfare implications of private and public
old-age insurance arrangements with the aid of numerical simulations. The advan-
tage of this method is two-fold: the macroeconomic effects of a financial instrument
can be computed immediately and exactly by computers, which could hardly be
shown analytically; while the minimal theoretical framework provide us with strong
and persuading intuitions. It is our intention to avoid the cluttering of large complex
models, as they barely provide any meaningful insights to our understanding of the
problem of ageing.2
In the second chapter we built a two-period overlapping generations model to
study the macroeconomic effects of private and public old-age insurance with asym-
metric information. With full information of mortality (or lifetime certainty), Yaari
(1965) has proved the benefit of annuities as a financial instrument to insure against
the longevity risk. Annuity, as an old-age insurance instrument, is a financial con-
tract that pays a premium upon survival into the old age and nothing upon death. In
real world private annuity markets are usually plagued by adverse selection: healthy
individuals often over-invest while unhealthy individuals are crowded out of the
market. The adverse selection is aggravated by the health-wealth nexus, as healthy
individuals are more likely to be wealthy. Thus we assumed that individuals differ
by two dimensions of heterogeneity: health and earning ability.3 With heterogeneous
individuals and asymmetric information, our findings are very different from that of
Yarri (1965). Firstly, we find that private annuity market with asymmetric informa-
tion reduces the output per efficiency unit of labour and capital intensity compared
with full information. Furthermore, the introduction of social security (public annu-
ity) aggravates the adverse selection in the private annuity market and reduces the
output per efficiency unit of labour and capital intensity further. Due to the redis-
tribution role of the social security, the individual welfare effects of social security
depends both on the individual type and pension benefit rule. Absent the redistri-
bution from unhealthy to healthy types, if the pension benefits are proportional to
contributions, then social security makes everybody worse off in the long run. Last
but not least, our simulation has shown that privatizing social security is not Pareto
1For the strengths and limitations of small macroeconomic models, see Turnovsky (2011).
2I do not mean to obscure the meaning of large complex models. Its strength lies in approximating
the real-world economy and is often used by banks and government research institutions.
3Our model is built on Heijdra and Reijnders (2012), which assumed one dimension of hetero-
geneity: health.
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improving for all generations: the higher welfare equilibrium in the long run comes
at the price of the shock time healthy individuals.
In the third chapter we used a two-period life-cycle model developed by Abel
(1986) to show that annuity puzzle can easily be explained by the interplay of asym-
metric information and bequest motives in the rational domain. Annuity puzzle usu-
ally refers to the fact that few people voluntarily purchase annuities while theoret-
ically they are very attractive financial instruments since their returns are superior
than non-annuitized savings. Davidoff et al. (2005) has proved that neither asym-
metric information nor bequest motives alone could explain the almost non-existent
private annuity market. We combined the two commonly considered reasons for the
annuity puzzle and found that together they would cause the low-health individuals
to leave the annuity market. The intuition behind the ‘interplay mechanism’ is that
asymmetric information and adverse selection would cut the premium of annuities
and bequest motives would enhance the value of non-annuitized assets. If the pri-
vate annuity is priced too dear due to adverse selection and individuals have strong
bequest motives, they would opt out of the annuity market. Later we extended the
model by including a pay-as-you-go social security system and introducing a cor-
relation between health and earning ability. The former one, as a public insurance
program, would crowd out the private annuities and the latter would aggravate the
adverse selection on the annuity market as heavier investment of healthier individ-
uals pushes down the annuity premium ever further.
In the fourth chapter we examine the macroeconomic effects of opening up an
annuity market in the presence of bequest motives. It is generally believed that indi-
viduals derive utilities from purchasing annuities if they don’t have a bequest motive.
As shown in chapter 3, individuals still benefit from purchasing actuarially-fair - or
at least not too unfair - annuities when they have a bequest motive. But the private
benefit from purchasing annuities does not guarantee a social welfare improvement.
Heijdra et al. (2014) have shown that in a dynamically efficient economy, opening up
an annuity market reduces unintended bequests and the intergenerational transfer
from the old to the young, and moves the economy away from the Golden Rule. As
a consequence, it reduces the capital intensity and individual welfare. In that paper
they have proved the Tragedy of Annuitization without the presence of intended be-
quest motives. We revisit the question by assuming intended bequest motives such
that a utility value is attached to intended bequests and the bequest motive is oper-
ative. We were able to show that a stronger bequest motive is associated with higher
capital accumulation as more assets are (intentionally) transferred from the old to
the young. More importantly, we find that when bequest motives are accounted for,
opening up an annuity market will again lead to a decrease in capital accumulation
and a drop in individual welfare. Tragedy of Annuitization prevails in the presence
of bequest motives, though the negative general equilibrium effect is dampened by
the bequest motives. Furthermore, having an imperfect annuity market seems to
restrain individuals from annuitizing their assets and diminished the negative gen-
eral equilibrium effects of opening up an annuity market. An extremely thin, almost
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non-existent annuity market is not necessarily a bad thing after all.
In the fifth chapter we developed a two-period overlapping generations model to
study the optimal fertility decisions for the society. We assume endogenous fertility
decisions such that individuals not only derive utility from their consumption but
also from their offsprings. Starting from Michel and Pestieau (1993) we used CES
utility/technology functions and a numerical method to find the interior solution for
the social optimum fertility decision. We investigated two concepts of social optimiza-
tion: the Samuelson social welfare concept with maximize the steady-state welfare
of a representative young individual, and Social welfare function where the social
optimum is dynamically consistent. The former criteria is static and the latter one
is preferred. Later we showed that a managed market economy with child taxes and
intergenerational transfers is able to replicate the first-best social optimum (FBSO)
under the social welfare function criteria. Not only do individuals enjoy a higher
welfare level in the first-best social optimum, we also showed that the transitional
path is an improvement for all generations except for the old generation at the shock
period.
Our thesis has focused on the problem of ageing and by combination of theoretical
and numerical methods we were able to show that to insure against the longevity
risk, individual decisions are very different from macroeconomic optimal choices.
Private annuities may be attractive to some healthy individuals but opening up
an annuity market is by no means beneficial to the society. The value of annuities
(annuity market) should be examined in a general equilibrium framework, in tandem
with bequest motives. We also explored the optimal fertility for the society, which
generally does not coincide with individual choices in laissez faire. With Child taxes
and intergenerational transfers, however, the government may induce individuals to
choose the optimal quantity and quality of children the society needs. After all, with
the prevalence of public pension programs, what provides a better insurance to the
old generation than a well-educated right-sized population of the next generation?
Chapter 7
Nederlandse Samenvatting
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In dit proefschrift is de aandacht gericht op het verband tussen internationale
handel en aantasting van het milieu. Er zijn input-outputanalyses gebruikt om
milieu-onderzoeksvragen in een periode van voortgaande globalisering te beantwo-
orden. In deze periode worden eindproducten beschouwd als made in the world
in plaats van in een enkel land. Hierna volgt de samenvatting van de belangrijkste
onderzoeksresultaten per hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift. Hoofstuk 2 focust op de uit-
stoot van koolstofdioxide die is ingebed in de handel (EET) van 40 grote economieën
in de periode van 1995 tot 2007. Onze onderzoeksresultaten komen overeen met de
uitkomsten van eerdere studies. Ze laten zien dat in vele ontwikkelde economieën de
emissies ingebed in importen (EEI) sneller groeiden dan de uitstoot ingebed in ex-
porten (EEE), terwijl dit in sommige opkomende economieën (zoals China en India)
andersom was en de EEE juist bijzonder snel stegen . Hoofdstuk 2 past een struc-
turele decompositieanalyse toe om uit te vinden wat de drijvende krachten achter
deze veranderingen in de EET waren. Wij berekenden de bijdrage van een aantal
geselecteerde factoren aan de veranderingen in de EET. Een van de voornaamste
bevindingen van dit hoofdstuk was dat veranderingen in de structuur van de handel
de belangrijkste verklaring zijn voor het grote verschil tussen ontwikkelde en op-
komende economieën in de groei van de EET. Producenten overal ter wereld zijn
ertoe overgegaan hun componenten en halffabricaten in opkomende economieën in
plaats van in ontwikkelde economieën in te kopen. In het geval van China betekent
dit dat producenten hun inkopen ook in eigen land doen. De tweede belangrijke
onderzoeksuitkomst van hoofdstuk 2 is dat toenames in de eindvraag en afnames
in de intensiteit van de uitstoot in belangrijke mate verantwoordelijk waren voor
veranderingen in de EET. Gemiddeld leidden toenames in de eindvraag tot meer
dan 50% groei in de EEE (EEI), terwijl een afname in de intensiteit van de uit-
stoot leidde tot een vermindering van 30% in de EEE (EEI). Kortom, het cruciale
punt in hoofdstuk 2 is dat ontwikkelde landen zoals de VS en het VK in 2007 niet
dezelfde rol speelden in de mondiale productie als in 1995. Dientengevolge bleven
in de ontwikkelde landen de “consumerende” emissies sterk groeien, terwijl hun ter-
ritoriale emissies relatief weinig toenamen. Dit ging dus ten koste van het milieu
in andere delen van de wereld. Hoofdstuk 3 onderwerpt de hypothese van de zoge-
naamde Kuznets-milieucurve (EKC) aan een nieuwe toetsing. Daarbij werd gebruik
gemaakt van gegevens omtrent de uitstoot van broeikasgassen (GHG) die op twee
verschillende manieren berekend was, enerzijds gebaseerd op de consumptie en an-
derzijds op de productie. Wij vonden dat de territoriale broeikasgassen (gebaseerd
op de productie) in zwakke mate overeenkomen met de EKC. Dat gold niet voor de
emissies uit de consumptie. Wij vonden ook een positief verband tussen inkomen en
het verschil tussen op consumptie gebaseerde en territoriale emissies (een maat voor
de netto import van emissies). Deze twee uitkomsten beloven weinig goeds voor de
wereld van de ontwikkelingslanden. Als arme landen hun BBP per inwoner verhogen,
zal dat leiden tot mondiale emissies die groter zijn dan je op grond van de territo-
riale EKC zou verwachten. Maar als rijke landen hetzelfde doen, zal de afname van
emissies kleiner zijn dan de territoriale EKC voorspelt. Bovendien: als meer landen
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een groei van het BBP vertonen, zal de vraag (van rijke landen) naar importen van
emissies toenemen, terwijl het aanbod (door arme landen) zal afnemen. Aangezien
dit onmogelijk is, zullen alleen de rijkste landen emissies kunnen importeren. Di-
entengevolge zal het keerpunt van de EKC voor territoriale emissies naar hogere
inkomensniveaus verschuiven. Bij een gelijkblijvende of groeiende bevolking kan het
zijn dat ontwikkeling alleen tot een geringere milieubelasting leidt indien er een
EKC voor uitstootindicatoren gebaseerd op consumptie zou bestaan. Hoofdstuk 4
richt zich op de gevolgen van de handel voor de volksgezondheid en de economie
van de invoer en uitvoer van emissies van verschillende verontreinigende stoffen en
toegevoegde waarde. Wij vergeleken de emissies ten gevolge van de export in de
VS met de emissies in de lucht in de VS die vermeden worden als gevolg van het
importeren van producten. Een van de voornaamste bijdragen van dit hoofdstuk
is dat het de financiële waarde van de gevolgen mat. Zo vonden wij dat de schade
verbonden aan de internationale handel aanzienlijk is en niet genegeerd kan worden.
In 2002 vermeden de VS milieuschade ter waarde van $32,7 miljard door goederen
te importeren. Tegelijkertijd veroorzaakten Amerikaanse exporten milieuschade ter
hoogte van $22,0 miljard. Dat houdt in dat de internationale handel een netto ver-
mindering van milieuschade ter hoogte van $10,7 miljard tot gevolg had. Met andere
woorden, de Amerikaanse handelsbalans zou in 2002 ongeveer 3% kleiner zijn geweest
als de maatschappelijke kosten van milieuvervuiling in aanmerking waren genomen.
De grootschalige vermijding van milieuschade in de VS houdt in hoge mate verband
met het enorme Amerikaanse handelstekort. Toch vertonen sommige bedrijfstakken
niet alleen een handelstekort maar ook een surplus aan schade. De oorzaak ligt in
het feit dat een sector uit verschillende industrieën bestaat, die soms aanzienlijk ver-
schillen ten aanzien van de milieuschade die zij aanrichten. Als de importen van een
sector in bepaalde industrieën geconcentreerd zijn, terwijl de exporten uit andere
industrieën komen, dan kan dit tegelijkertijd leiden tot een handelstekort en een
groei van de schade. Bovendien bleek dat de verhouding tussen de milieuschade en
de toegevoegde waarde in hoge mate verschilde tussen de ene industrie en de andere.
In sommige bedrijfstakken, zoals de productie van zwarte koolstof , zijn exporten
zo schadelijk voor het milieu dat meer dan de helft van de toegevoegde waarde die
additionele exporten voortbrengen aan milieuschade verloren gaat. Deze bevindin-
gen doen vermoeden dat de VS meer profijt van zijn handel zouden hebben als hun
exporten meer in de relatief onschadelijke bedrijfstakken (die meestal in de terti-
aire sector liggen) zouden groeien dan in de zeer milieuschadelijke industrieën (die
meestal in de primaire en secundaire sector liggen). Hoofdstuk 5 focust op de fouten
die voortkomen uit de uiteenlopende schattingen van het full global multiregional
input-output-model (het GMRIO-model). Hierbij vroegen wij ons af in hoeverre in
een land de verantwoordelijkheid of voetafdruk van de consumenten verandert indien
weinig of geen informatie voorhanden is omtrent bepaalde landen of regio’s. Om de
werkelijkheid na te bootsen, lieten wij één land weg uit de input-outputtabel voor
de hele wereld en schatten vervolgens de gegevens voor dit land. Hierdoor kwam
aan het licht dat er ernstige afwijkingen kunnen ontstaan wanneer in plaats van de
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werkelijke emissiecoëfficiënten voor het weggelaten land geschatte gemiddelde coëf-
ficiënten worden gebruikt, of wanneer de reële matrix van technische coëfficiënten
vervangen wordt door een schatting gebaseerd op een gemiddelde matrix. Verder
kan het weglaten van een land uit de mondiale gegevens grote gevolgen hebben
voor de schatting van de consumentenverantwoordelijkheid van naburige landen en
handelspartners, indien deze in hoge mate afhankelijk zijn van importen uit het
weggelaten land. Wij stelden vast dat het gebruik van een “regionale vertegenwo-
ordiger” om de reële technische coëfficiënten van een weggelaten land te schatten tot
veel betere schattingen van de consumentenverantwoordelijkheid kan leiden. Hoewel
onderzoekers zich in toenemende mate hebben ingespannen om aan gedetailleerde en
betrouwbare informatie voor het opstellen van volledige GMRIO-tabellen te komen,
lijden zij onder allerlei beperkingen op het gebied van kwaliteit, tijd en middelen
die het verzamelen van de gegevens bemoeilijken. De uitkomsten van hoofdstuk 5
kunnen onderzoekers helpen om hun beperkte middelen doelmatiger te gebruiken
voor het verzamelen en genereren van data.
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